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The Effects of Intermarriage on the
Earnings of Female Immigrants
in the United States
Milena Nikolova

Abstract
This paper investigates the effects of intermarriage on the earnings of
female immigrants in the United States. The main empirical question asked is
whether immigrant females married to US-born spouses have higher earnings
than those of immigrant females married to other immigrants. Using 1970 and
1870 samples of IPUMS data, I estimate an earnings equation through OLS. I
also correct for the labor force selection bias using the Heckman procedure.
I finally take into account the endogeneity of intermarriage and apply a twostage least squares (2SLS) estimation procedure. I find that there is a positive
marriage premium among immigrant females in the United States but a
negative intermarriage premium for exogamously married females compared
to endogamously married females. My results show that the longer the
immigrant stays in the host country, the higher her wages, which is evidence
for the assimilation effect over time. I find some evidence for a negative labor
force selection bias among immigrant females. In other words, higher human
capital women may select themselves out of the labor force, while lower human
capital women are working for wages. Among those who are in the labor force,
however, married females earn more than singles. I also conclude that being
an immigrant from an English-speaking country does not have any impact on
wages. Both premiums become statistically insignificant in difference from
zero when 2SLS is used as an estimation procedure.
I.

INTRODUCTION
This paper investigates the effects of intermarriage on the earnings of female
immigrants in the United States. The main empirical question asked is whether
there exists an intermarriage premium, i.e. whether immigrant females married
to US-born spouses have higher earnings than immigrant females married
to other immigrants. Studying the determinants of immigrants’ earnings is
important for several reasons. From an applied economics perspective, this
5

study adds to the deeper understanding of labor market processes such as
the transferability of human capital across countries. This research expands
the existing literature by estimating both the marriage and intermarriage
premiums for female foreigners. More precisely, I look at the wage differentials
between intermarried and non-intermarried females. From the vantage point
of sociology, intermarriage is important as it constitutes the highest degree
of assimilation of immigrants (Wildsmith, Gutmann, and Gratton, 2003).
From a public policy view, it is necessary to understand the implications of
intermarriage on the economic assimilation of immigrants in order to make
adequate public policy decisions. Lack of assimilation of immigrants may result
in social and political turmoil. Understanding of the processes of immigration
and assimilation is a necessary public policy prerequisite, especially given the
relatively big flows of immigrants in the United States.
In this paper, by intermarriage or exogamous marriage, I mean the de
facto marital union between a female immigrant and a US-born male. Any
immigrant married to a non-native will be considered non-intermarried or
endogamously married. 1
This research question has its theoretical foundations in the marriage and
assimilation literatures, and it belongs to the new branch of intermarriage
literature. The marriage literature finds that married men have higher incomes
than single men. Married men benefit from marriage as their spouses may
choose to specialize in household production to support the human capital
accumulation of their husbands, which would later lead to husbands’ higher
earnings (Becker 1973). At the same time, however, Becker (1985) argues
that because raising children and housework require more effort than other
household activities, married women are less productive in the labor market
than married men for similar human capital endowments. Empirical results
show that while the marriage premium is well established for males, there
might be a zero or a negative premium for women. Neumark and Koremann
(1992) find a positive female marriage premium but provide no compelling
explanation for it.
Duleep and Sanders (1993) suggest that the gap between actual and potential
earnings for the endogamously married females might not close over time, as
they may take dead-end jobs to support their husbands’ investment in human
capital. In other words, upon arrival, immigrant wives may work more than their
husbands to support them (Baker and Benjamin, 1997). Using Canadian data,
1

The terms “exogamous” and “endogamous” marriage are borrowed from Meng and Gregory’s paper (2005).
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Baker and Benjamin (1997) find empirical evidence for the family investment
hypothesis for endogamously married females. Given the family investment
hypothesis, decisions regarding the labor force for intermarried immigrants
may differ from those of non-intermarried immigrant females. In particular,
intermarried females might feel protected by their husband’s social networks
and financial support and might not feel the pressing need to perform to the
best of their ability or take jobs with long hours, etc.
According to the assimilation literature, upon arrival, immigrants have
lower earnings than natives because of the relative intransferability of skills
across countries, insufficient host-country language skills, lack of information
about the host country’s culture and labor markets, as well as other factors.
Chiswick (1978) proposes that this “initial earning deficiency” disappears as
immigrants spend more time in the host country and gain country-specific
knowledge and experience.2
The intermarriage literature is a new branch that unites the marriage
and assimilation literatures. Using Australian census data for four years,
Meng and Gregory (2005) were the first researchers to study intermarriage
as a mechanism for economic assimilation. When they take into account the
endogeneity of marriage, the intermarriage premium is 5% for men and 10%
for women. Meng and Gregory’s results cannot be extrapolated to the U.S.
case since the immigrant pools are different in the two countries. While they
account for the endogeneity of intermarriage, Meng and Gregory fail to correct
for the labor force participation selection problem, which may be particularly
severe in the female sample.3
Using French data, Meng and Meurs (2006) study the effects of intermarriage
on the economic assimilation process for female and male immigrants. They
propose that the intermarriage effects of economic assimilation should consist of
an improvement in the language skills and the acquisition of information about
the local labor markets. When individual characteristics and the endogeneity
of intermarriage are taken into account, the premium rises to between 25%
and 35%. The authors find that the magnitude of the intermarriage premium is
higher for individuals with better language skills.
2

In addition, as time spent in the United States increases, immigrants are more likely to move to jobs where 		
their productivity is higher, which is another explanation for the closing of the earnings gap (Chiswick, 1978).
3 With the labor force selection problem, we are concerned that the sample of working individuals is a nonrandom sample of the population since for those who are working, the reservation wage is below the market
wage. In this sense, the selection bias is equally valid for male and for female samples. In addition, the selection
bias could be present in the male sample as well since, just like females, males could be facing the same 		
constraints and responsibilities within the household (i.e. time to take care of children, housework, etc). Given
the traditional gender roles of females, however, it is generally agreed that the workforce selection bias is 		
greater in female samples than in male samples (Korenmann and Neumark, 1992).
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To date, Kantarevic (2004) is the only scholar to investigate the link between
intermarriage and the economic assimilation of immigrants using United States
IPUMS data for 1970 and 1980. He finds evidence for his selection hypothesis,
which is based on the assumption that the relationship between intermarriage
and assimilation is spurious, as the intermarried immigrants could well be a
self-selected sample of all married immigrants. In other words, he considers
a selection bias related to intermarriage rather than an endogeneity problem.
Even if the place of birth does not affect productivity, the birthplace of the
spouse may be related with work productivity. He further argues that this
could be due to omitting a characteristic such as personal charisma or physical
appearance. Kantarevic also examines the productivity hypothesis that native
spouses facilitate human capital accumulation of their immigrant partners,
implying that the earnings of intermarried immigrants must be statistically
significantly different than those of identical non-intermarried immigrants.4
Kantarevic finds a 2.5% premium for male intermarried immigrants, but the
premium disappears once he corrects for the selection bias.
Given the literature, the question that this paper asks remains unanswered.
Using IPUMS data for 1970 and 1980, and correcting for the labor force
selection bias and the endogeneity of marriage, this project contributes
to the intermarriage literature in at least two ways through (i) studying the
female sample to provide a fuller view of the United States labor and marriage
markets; (ii) studying both the intermarriage and marriage premiums among
immigrants. In Section II, I present the model. In Section III, I discuss the
data and methodology, followed by the empirical results in Section IV. Finally,
Section V offers the concluding remarks.
II. EMPIRICAL MODEL
The formal theoretical model is developed by Kantarevic (2004), based
on a standard immigrant earnings equation proposed by Borjas (1999). An
immigrant has the following choices of marriage: to marry endogamously (i.e.
marry another member of her own group or another foreign-born individual),
to marry exogamously (i.e. marry a native-born individual), or to remain single.
The individual’s objective is to maximize her lifetime utility, which is a function
of monetary and non-monetary gains associated with each type of marriage.
The expected earnings and the marital state depend on the human capital and
assimilation variables for each individual. The costs for each type of marriage
depend on the individual characteristics and alternative determinants of costs.
4

Human capital accumulation stemming from intermarriage can be only imperfectly observed or not observed at all.
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Based on Kantarevic’s theoretical model, following empirical model can be
developed:
Yit = α0 + α1 Marriedit + α2 Exogamousit + α3 Hit + α4 Ait + εit
(1)
where the dependent variable Yit is the log hourly wage, Married is a dummy
variable having a value of one for married females and 0 for singles, Exogamous
is a dummy variable having a value of one for exogamously married females
and 0 for singles and endogamously married females, H is a vector of human
capital and demographic variables (age, years of schooling, race, place of
birth, place of residence, etc), and A captures the assimilation variable years
since migration.5 A detailed description of the dependent variables and the
independent variables is available in Table 1 in the Appendix.
The regression equation for the Heckman labor force selection
correction model is similar to the wage equation (1). It is observed only when
the labor market wage is greater than the reservation wage for each female
immigrant, i.e when the income earned is positive. The Selection mechanism
is given by the following equations: 6
Selection Mechanism:
Zi* = γ’Wi + μi
Zi = 1 if Zi* > 0,
Zi = 0 if Zi* ≤ 0
Prob (Zi = 1) = Φ (γ’Wi),
Prob (Zi = 0) = 1- Φ (γ’Wi).
Regression Model:
Yi = α+ βiXi + εi observed if Zi = 1
(μ, εi ) ~ N[0,0,1,σε , ρ]
where Zi* is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the female earns income, and equal
to 0 otherwise. Wi is a vector of human capital, demographic, and assimilation
variables, as well as indicator variables for marital status.7 The instrumental
variables used in the selection equation are the number of own children under
5 years of age, and the number of own children aged 5-18.
If the decision to intermarry is independent of the potential earnings,
we do not have an endogeneity problem and estimating Equation (1) with
OLS would provide consistent and efficient estimates of the true population
5 The squared term of the variable years since migration was dropped from the model because it was highly col		
linear with the age and years since migration variable. An English language proficiency variable would have
been a good additional assimilation variable. It is not included because of its unavailability for both sample years.
6 Greene (2007).
7 The maximum likelihood function for this model is given by Maddala (1983).
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parameters. The decision to intermarry, however, may not be independent of
the potential earnings, which makes the intermarriage variable endogenous.
There may also be a simultaneity issue as intermarriage could be a factor
causing and a result of economic assimilation. Since the nature of the marriage
decision is endogenous, equation (1) is estimated through a two-stage least
squares (2SLS) regression using the sex ratio and the probability of interethnic
marriage as the two instrumental variables.
III. DATA AND METHODS
The ideal data for this paper would be panel data where the same individuals
are traced over time. Due to the unavailability of such data, this paper, like the
study by Kantarevic (2004), uses two cross-sectional samples (i.e. pooled data)
- 1970 Form 1 State Sample and 1980 1% Metro Sample U.S. Census samples
of Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS-98).8 These samples have information
on age at first marriage and the year of immigration, which are used in the
construction of a variable indicating whether an immigrant individual arrived
as single.9 Using at least two years of data allows to control for cohort and
ageing effects (Kantarevic, 2004). 10
The dependent variable in this study is the logarithm of hourly wage for
females (in 2000 real dollars), constructed by dividing yearly wages by the
product of average weeks of work and the average hours of work.11,12 The
independent variables fall in two categories: human capital/demographic and
assimilation variables (Table 1). The human capital/demographic variables are:
age 2
age, 1000 , education, three indicator variables for place of residence (West,
Midwest, South, where Northeast is the comparison group), six indicator
variables for place of birth (North America, South America, Central America
and the Caribbean, Asia, Africa, Other, where Europe is the comparison group),
three indicator variables for race (Black, Asian, and Other Race, where White
is the comparison group).13
8 The IPUMS-USA consists of thirty-eight samples drawn from every available census from 1850 to 2000. It
is not panel data, i.e. it does not trace the same individuals over time. Both samples are 1-in-100 national 		
random samples of the population. Sample availability, documentation and other information are available at
www.ipums.org/usa/.
9 Later samples do not have the information about age at first marriage
10 An ageing effect occurs among all cohorts when a variable changes independently as cohorts grow older
(Blanchard, Bunker, and Wachs, 2002). Cohort effects are independent of ageing effects and capture changes 		
affecting populations born at a particular point in time (Blanchard, Bunker, and Wachs, 2002). As Kantarevic
(2004) points out, the identification of each effect could be done with panel data or with at least several randomly
selected cross-sections, which allows for cohorts to be tracked across years.
11 As the information about weeks and hours worked in 1970 are only available in intervals, these variables were
recoded as having values equal to the average of each interval. For consistency, although direct, self-reported
information is available for 1980, the interval variables were used in the same way as for 1970.
12 The appropriate CPI (All Urban Consumers) was used in the creation of the real values of all dollar variables.
13 The most populous category for each variable was used as an omitted (reference) category.
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Age is used as a proxy variable for experience; given basic labor theory,
age 2
I expect a positive coefficient estimate on age. In addition, the variable //////
1000
accounts for the possible concavity of earnings as a function of age.14 I expect
a negative coefficient estimate on the squared term of age. Since education
increases marginal productivity and therefore wages, I expect a positive
coefficient estimate on years of schooling. The assimilation variable, years
since migration, is a count variable and I expect a positive coefficient estimate
on it. 15
The female sample is limited to foreign-born female singles and spouses,
aged 16 to 65. Using the variables for the length of marriage and year of
immigration, the sample is restricted to females who came to the United States
as unmarried.16,17 The female sample consists only of females whose native
language is not English. The rationale is that English-speaking immigrants
could assimilate at a faster rate than non-English speaking immigrants, thus
pulling up the average earnings of female immigrants.18 The male sample is
limited to individuals aged 14 to 70 to allow an age difference between actual
and potential spouses at both ends of the age distribution.
Next, the dummies endogamous, exogamous, and single are created.
The exogamous indicator variable has a value of one for all foreign-born
females who are married to the US-born male heads of households and whose
husband’s birthplace is the United States. It has a zero value for singles and
for endogamously married females. The endogamous indicator variable has a
value of one for all foreign-born females aged 16-65, married to foreign-born
male heads of households.19, 20
To correct for selection bias related to the labor force participation, two
instrumental variables are used in the Heckman procedure: number of own
children under age of five and number of own children aged 5 to 18. I expect
that having own children lowers the probability of being in the labor force. The
14 The division by 1000 is done to avoid scaling effects.
15 The square term of the variable was considered as an additional covariate to capture any concavity of the
earnings function over time but was not included in the main regressions due to collinearity issues.
16 In this paper, the category “separated” is treated as “married.”
17 Technically, even females who were married upon arrival have the chance to intermarry through divorcing
their spouses. Those who face the actual decision of intermarriage, however, are the non-married individuals
(i.e. divorced, widowed, and never married individuals) (Gregory and Meng, 2005).
18 This restriction was later relaxed and for comparison purposes, results from the full sample are provided in
Table 9 in the appendix. It is important to point out that the full sample regression results are not substantially
different from the main regression results.
19 The married sample of females in this paper is therefore limited to immigrant spouses married to heads. This
is a relatively good way to look at the data since 95% of the married men were heads of household and 5.5% of
the married women were heads of household. In other words, 94.5% of the married women were spouses.
20 A different specification check could be including a dummy variable for endogamously married females whose
spouses are non-US-born native English speakers. Table 10 provides the results from this model.
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probability of interethnic marriage and the sex ratio are used as instruments
in the 2SLS model to correct for the endogeneity of intermarriage. First, the
probability of interethnic intermarriage for females, is:
Zisg = (msg/Mg)/(ns/N)
where msg is the number of single (never married, divorced, and widowed) men
in state s of country of origin g (Kantarevic, 2004). Mg is the total number of
unmarried men in country of origin g in all states; ns is the number of unmarried
US-born males in a state s, and N is the total number of unmarried men in
all states. 21 The smaller the value of the probability of marrying within is, the
higher the likelihood of marrying a native spouse is.
The likelihood of intermarriage also depends on the sex ratio is defined
as:
SEXRATIOf = Mmsg/ Mfsg
where Mmsg and Mfsg are the numbers of males and females, respectively, in the
specific nativity-state group. The higher the sex ratio, the more likely it is for
the female to marry within her own native group.22
All four instrumental variables (number of children under age of 5, number
of children aged 5 to 18, sex ratio, probability of marrying within) theoretically
satisfy the exclusion restriction. The number of children in the respective ages
affects the decision to enter the labor force but does not directly affect wages.
Similarly, the probability of interethnic marriage and the sex ratio affect the
marriage decision but not wages.23
This paper uses three different estimation techniques: ordinary least
squares regression with robust standard errors (OLS), Heckman labor force
selection correction, and two-stage least squares (2SLS).24,25 I expect the OLS
estimates to be biased and inconsistent due to the selection and endogeneity
problems.26

21 The terms single (never married, divorced, and widowed) and unmarried are used interchangeably in this paper.
22 The instrument for the probability of marrying within could be thought of as measuring the relative availability
of foreign-born potential spouses over native potential spouses, while the sex ratio captures the relative avail
ability of foreign men to foreign women, i.e. the intra-nativity group competition for spouses.
23 The appropriate census weights were used in the creation of the sex ratio and the probability of marrying within.
24 The reference group in all models is singles.
25 Equation (1) is first estimated through OLS with robust standard errors to correct possible heteroskedasticity,
which is common in cross-sectional data. I also added the sample weights to make the regression representative
of the population data.
26 To address the selection problem regarding the labor force participation, the Heckman correction procedure is
followed with the number of own children in the respective age groups as instruments. To address the problem
that the choice of intermarriage is endogenous, the two-stage least squares procedure is performed using the sex
ratio and the probability of marrying within as instruments.
12

IV. RESULTS
1. Summary Statistics
The final sample consists of 28,970 female immigrants, 11,313 in 1970,
and 17,657 in 1980. The intermarried females were 6,386 or around 50% of all
married females during both sample years. In 1970, the number of exogamously
married female foreigners was 3,299, or 55% of all married foreigners, and in
1980, the total was 3,087 or 45% of all married female foreigners. Table 2a shows
the places of origin for the most populous groups of female immigrants as well as
the percentage of exogamously and endogamously married, and single females.
Among the countries of origin with the highest share of exogamously married
females are Sweden (36% of all immigrants in the sample were exogamously
married), Germany (34% of all immigrants were intermarried), and Italy (29%
of all immigrants in the sample were exogamously married). The countries with
the lowest share of exogamously married females are India (12%), China (14%),
and Turkey (15%). The countries with the highest percentage of endogamously
married females are Yugoslavia (33%), Italy (31%), China (31%), and the USSR
(31%). Table 2b shows the intermarriage rates among individuals from the same
place of origin, measured by the proportion of exogamously married people of
all married individuals from the same country of origin. The countries with
the highest percentage of intermarried immigrants are Japan (73%), Germany
(71%), and the African countries (66%).
Table 2a: Major Places of Origin and Marriage Rates

Mexico
Central America
Cuba
South America
Sweden
Italy
Germany
Yugoslavia
USSR
China
Japan
India
Turkey
Africa
Number of Observations

Total
4,641
960
1,872
1,381
216
2,412
3,443
369
847
773
498
170
101
266

Exog
0.20
0.17
0.08
0.16
0.36
0.29
0.34
0.20
0.22
0.14
0.24
0.12
0.15
0.26
6,386

Std.dev
0.40
0.38
0.28
0.37
0.48
0.45
0.48
0.40
0.42
0.34
0.43
0.33
0.36
0.44

Endog
0.28
0.21
0.22
0.17
0.19
0.31
0.14
0.33
0.31
0.31
0.09
0.26
0.22
0.14
6,549

Std. Dev
0.45
0.41
0.42
0.38
0.39
0.46
0.35
0.47
0.46
0.46
0.29
0.44
0.41
0.34

Single
0.52
0.61
0.69
0.66
0.45
0.41
0.51
0.48
0.47
0.55
0.67
0.62
0.63
0.60
16,035

Std. dev
0.50
0.49
0.46
0.47
0.50
0.49
0.50
0.50
0.50
0.50
0.47
0.49
0.48
0.49

(1) The data on percentage intermarried reports the fraction of all individiuals of a particular place of origin who are married to a US-born
husband. Similar calculations were performed for the endogamous and single groups for both sample years
(2) The data are listed only for selected major places of origin
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Table 2b: Intermarriage rates among major groups

Mexico
Central America
Cuba
South America
Sweden
Italy
Germany
Yugoslavia
USSR
China
Japan
India
Turkey
Africa

Number Intermar
2,210
372
575
468
118
1,434
1,678
193
452
348
165
65
37
106

Mean
0.41
0.45
0.27
0.49
0.66
0.48
0.71
0.38
0.42
0.30
0.73
0.32
0.41
0.66

Std. Dev
0.49
0.50
0.45
0.50
0.48
0.50
0.46
0.49
0.49
0.46
0.45
0.47
0.50
0.48

(1) The data on percentage intermarried reports the fraction of all married
individiuals of a particular place of origin who are married to a US-born
husband for both census years
(2) The data are listed only for selected major places of origin

Table 3 shows the sample summary statistics for the intermarried and nonintermarried female immigrants. First, the age structure seems to be similar for
all three groups, where all groups have a younger average age in the 1980 sample
than in the 1970 sample. The exogamous group has spent more years in the US
on average than the endogamous group and the difference between the groups
is larger in 1980 than in 1970. The single group has spent the shortest amount
of time in the US among the three groups. On average, the exogamous group
has more years of education than both the single and the endogamous group
for both time periods and the single group has more years of schooling than the
endogamous group for both census years. The level of educational attainment
was higher in 1980 than in 1970 for all groups. The summary statistics on
husband’s years of schooling and real annual wages (in 2000 constant dollars),
and total family annual income (in 2000 constant dollars) are important for
putting the analysis in a family context. 27

27 Exogamously married females and their husbands on average have more years of schooling than endogamously
married females and their husbands. This is one example of assortative marriage, i.e. higher human capital men
marrying higher human capital women. This statistic could have potential effects on the work outcomes for
women. In particular, relying on the higher incomes and social networks of their husbands, exogamously married
females could choose to work less or choose not to take jobs that require a lot of effort.
14

Table 3: Sample Summary Statistics: Intermarried and Non-Intermarried Females
1970
Exogamous
Endogamous
Single
Mean
Std. Dev.
Mean
Std. Dev.
Mean
Std. Dev
Age
42.27
13.91
44.90
14.90
41.81
17.79
Years In US
30.33
16.38
29.02
17.79
23.43
17.02
Years of Schooling
13.91
3.44
12.21
4.21
12.73
4.18
Husband's years of schooling
14.36
0.71
12.93
1.70
Husband's real annual wage income
36,382
3,888
31,364
8,584
Total real family annual income
46,847
6,404
42,841
6,510
49,437
6,542
3,299
2,701
5,313
Number of observations
1980
Exogamous
Endogamous
Single
Mean
Std. Dev.
Mean
Std. Dev.
Mean
Std. Dev
Age
34.26
9.61
33.75
9.89
35.76
15.37
Years In US
19.61
7.61
15.34
8.03
14.74
8.23
Years of Schooling
15.21
3.52
13.88
4.21
14.05
4.09
Husband's years of schooling
15.21
0.78
13.60
2.23
Husband's real annual wage income
32,637
3,089
27,254
6,143
Total real family annual income
49,461
6,432
42,554
7,393
42,113
7,179
3,087
3,848
10,721
Number of observations

On average, the husbands of the exogamously married females have more
years of schooling than their spouses in both years, and the exogamously married
females have more years of schooling than the husbands of the endogamously
married females in 1970. The group with the lowest average level of education
is the endogamously married females in 1970 and their husbands in 1980. The
husbands of the exogamous group had higher average real annual wages than
the husbands of the endogamous group for both years. The average real annual
wages for both groups of husbands were lower in 1980 than in 1970. Similarly,
the average total real family annual income for the exogamously married
females was higher than that of their endogamously married counterparts for
both years. The singles had the highest total average income in 1970 and the
lowest average income in 1980.
Table 4 shows the average real hourly wage (in 2000 constant dollars) for
the exogamous and endogamous groups.
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In 1970, the average hourly wage was $15.91 for intermarried females,
$14.76 for non-intermarried females, and $13.79 for singles. In 1980, the
average hourly wage was lower for all groups, with the highest wage of $12.52
for the endogamous group, which is similar to Kantarevic’s findings for the
male sample. This could be reflective of the recessions during the 1970s or
could be a result of the quality of the immigrant pool in 1980. Table 4 also
shows the hours per week and weeks worked. In both years, singles had the
longest hours of work and weeks worked. In 1970, the endogamous group had
more average weeks worked and hours per week worked than the exogamous
group. In 1980, the exogamous group worked on average more weeks than
the endogamous group but the endogamous group worked on average longer
hours per week.
2.

OLS Regression Results
Table 5 presents the results from the earnings equation (1) estimated through
OLS with robust standard errors, the Heckman procedure, and the 2SLS. Let us
consider the OLS regression results, which I suspect are likely to be biased and
inconsistent given the selection bias and the endogeneity problem.
The coefficient estimate on the marriage dummy is positive and
statistically significant in difference from zero. In particular, on average, the
predicted value of the earnings of married female immigrants is approximately
6.2% higher than those of their single counterparts. This result is contrary to
Becker’s (1985) theoretical framework. It is important to point out that the
females in this particular sample are only immigrant females, who could have
different family experiences and work patterns than the average Americanborn woman. The coefficient estimate on the exogamous indicator variable
from the OLS regression is negative and statistically significant in difference
from zero. It indicates that the predicted value of the earnings for exogamously
married females is around 6.1% lower than that for the endogamously married.
The coefficient estimates on age and its squared term, which are statistically
significant in difference from zero, show that earnings are an increasing and
concave function of age. An additional year is expected to increase the predicted
value of the real hourly earnings of female immigrants by around 4.2%, holding
constant the influence of the other included independent variables.
An additional year of schooling is expected to increase the predicted
value of real hourly wages by around 4.5%, holding constant the influence of
the other included independent variables.
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The coefficient estimates on years of schooling is statistically significant
in difference from zero. Relative to the wages of immigrants born in Europe,
the predicted value of the earnings of the immigrants born in North America
are likely to be 22 % lower, holding constant the influence of the other included
independent variables. The coefficient estimates on the indicator for North
American origin is statistically significant in difference from zero.28 Relative
to earnings of European immigrants, the predicted value of the earnings of
immigrants born in South America, Asia, and Africa are higher, but the
coefficient estimates are not statistically significant in difference from zero.
Relative to the wages of immigrants born in Europe, the predicted earnings
of the immigrants born in Central America and the Caribbean are lower by
about 3.2%, holding constant the influence of the other included independent
variables. Relative to the earnings of immigrants born in Europe, the immigrants
born in other regions are likely to be approximately 5.6% lower, holding
constant the influence of the other included independent variables. Relative to
the earnings of immigrants living in the North East, immigrants living in the
Midwest, South, and West regions are lower. Relative to the earnings of White
immigrant females, the earnings of Black immigrants are around 6% higher,
holding constant the influence of the other included independent variables.
The coefficient estimates on Asian and other race are positive but not
statistically significant in difference from zero. The coefficient estimate on years
spent in the United States is positive and statistically significant in difference
from zero. In particular, each additional year spent in the United States
increases the predicted value of the real hourly wage by about 0.2%, holding
constant the influence of the other included independent variables. This result
suggests that an assimilation process is taking place, i.e. immigrant wages are
increasing as the number of years they spend in the host country increase. Last,
the coefficient estimate on the indicator variable for 1980 suggests that the
predicted value of the real hourly earnings in 1980 were 19.5% lower than those
in 1970, holding constant the influence of the other included independent
variables. This result could be an echo effect from the economic recessions in
1973 and 1979.29
28 The only North American country is Mexico, since immigrants from Canada are English-speaking and are not
included in the sample. The coefficient estimate on being born in North America changes its sign when the full
sample results are introduced in Table 9 but the coefficient estimate is not statistically significant in difference
from zero.
29 In general, the total private seasonally adjusted average real wages in 1980 were 5. 46% lower than the cor
responding value for 1970 for the US economy. Source: author’s calculations using BLS data. http://data.bls.gov.
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3.

Heckman Selection Correction Regression Results
Table 5 contains the earnings regression results, while Table 6 in the
Appendix contains the Probit results. In this section, I discuss only selected
results pertaining to the probability of being in the labor force and the corrected
earnings results. First, the Probit results indicate that most coefficient estimates
have the expected signs and are statistically significant in difference from zero.
As expected, being married, as well as the presence of own children, have a
negative impact on the probability of being in the labor force. The coefficient
estimate on the exogamous dummy indicates that relative to the endogamously
married and singles, exogamously married immigrants have a lower probability
of being in the labor force. Older age and having more years of schooling
increase the probability of working for wages. Relative to immigrants born in
Europe, immigrants born in all other places but North America and Central
America and the Caribbean, have lower probability of working for wages.
The coefficient estimate on the indicator for birthplace in North America and
Central America-Caribbean are both statistically insignificant in difference
from zero. Relative to immigrants living in the Northeast, immigrants living in
all other regions but the Midwest have a lower probability of being in the labor
force. The coefficient estimates on all three indicator variables for place of
residence are not statistically significant in difference from zero. All other races
have higher probability of working for wages relative to Whites, which is the
comparison group. Interestingly, the longer the immigrants stay in the United
States, the lower their probability of being in the labor force. As mentioned
above, these females could be supported by their husband’s income and status
in society. Last, immigrants observed in 1980 had a higher probability of being
in the labor force relatively to those observed in 1970.
The Heckman results indicate that the marriage premium is around 7%
and statistically significant in difference from zero. The intermarriage penalty
is around 6.1% and is statistically significant in difference from zero.30 The
coefficient estimates on all other included variables have not changed much
from the OLS results. The coefficient estimate on lambda is negative, but
not statistically significant in difference from zero, indicating that there is a
weak support for the negative selection bias in the labor force among female
immigrants. In other words, my results show weak evidence that higher human
capital immigrants are not working for wages. At the same time, among those
30 Kantarevic’s Heckman results for the male sample indicate a positive but insignificant premium. Correcting for
an intermarriage selection bias, rather than the endogeneity of intermarriage, Kantarevic calculates the
assimilation effect, i.e. the difference between the coefficient estimates on age (age squared), years since
migration (years since migration squared) over the two time periods.
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who are working for wages, there is a positive marriage premium and an
intermarriage penalty. One explanation for the marriage premium could be the
fact that the average age for both sample years of these immigrants is between
42-45 years for 1970, and 34-36 for 1980. More precisely, if these women have
own children, these children are possibly old enough to provide help with the
household chores and raising younger siblings. This additional help could
take away part of the effort for the mothers. As they do not need to put so
much effort and labor within the household, these women could improve their
performance at work, allowing them to earn higher wages than their single
counterparts. It is important to emphasize that foreign females could have
different work patterns and household experiences than the American-born
females. In addition, both the OLS results and the Heckman results show a
wage penalty for immigrants who are married to US-born spouses relative
to those married to foreign-born spouses. One possible explanation for this
penalty is that unlike the endogamous group, intermarried females do not face
the pressure to increase their productivity and performance on the job.31 In
light of the family investment hypothesis, an additional explanation of this
result could focus on the endogamous group. Non-intermarried females might
need to be more productive or take higher paying jobs than their intermarried
counterparts in order to support their husband’s investments in human
capital.
4.

Probability of Intermarriage and 2SLS Regression results
Table 7 in the Appendix shows the multinomial logistic regression results
for the probability of being intermarried for the exogamous and endogamous
groups.32 Most coefficient estimates have the expected signs and are statistically
significant in difference from zero. The probability of intermarriage is an
increasing and concave function of age since the coefficient estimate on age
is positive and the coefficient on the squared term of age is negative for both
groups. Relative to singles, more years of schooling increases the probability
of marrying exogamously and lowers the probability of being endogamously
married. Relative to being born in Europe, which is the omitted category, being
born in any other region but North America lowers the probability of being
exogamously married relative to being single. Relative to being born in Europe,
being born in any other region but Central America and the Caribbean lowers
31 As Table 3 shows, intermarried females enjoy both higher average husband’s income and higher total family
incomes than the non-intermarried immigrants.
32 The reference category is singles.
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the probability of being exogamously married relative to being single. Relative
to living in the Northeast, which is the omitted category, living in any other
region increases the probability of being exogamously married relative to being
single and lowers the probability of being endogamously married relative to
being single. Relative to being White, which is the omitted category, being Black
and Asian lowers the probability of being intermarried relative to being single,
while belonging to other races increases the probability of being intermarried
relative to being single. Relative to being White, being Black and Other race
lowers the probability of being endogamously married relative to single, while
being Asian increases the probability of being endogamously married relative
to being single. Spending more years in the United States increases both the
probability of being intermarried and being non-intermarried relative to
being single. Higher values for the sex ratio increases the probability of being
intermarried and being endogamously married relative to being single. The
relative availability of marriage partners from own ethnic group decreases the
probability of being married to a native relative to not being married at all
and increases the probability of being married to a foreigner relative to being
single.
In the 2SLS procedure, the decisions to marry and intermarry are treated
as endogenous. The results are shown in Table 5. Most coefficient estimates
are not statistically significant in difference from zero. I am only going to
focus on the coefficient estimates on the marriage indicators and the years
spent in the United States. Although none of these three coefficient estimates
is statistically significant in difference from zero, I am going to discuss their
economic significance. First, the marriage premium entirely disappears and
becomes a marriage penalty of over 100%. Second, the intermarriage penalty
is still negative and it more than triples in size. Third, the coefficient estimate
on years spent in the Untied States remains positive, suggesting an assimilation
effect of spending more time in the host country.
5.

Specification Check: Relaxing the Non-English Speaking Criterion
The regression results when the restriction that immigrants should come
from a non-English speaking country (NESC) is relaxed are shown in Table
8 in the Appendix. They serve as a specification check and do not show any
fundamental differences with the NESC results. The coefficient estimate on
the marriage premium is positive and statistically significant in difference from
zero from the OLS and Heckman results, and is negative and insignificant
from the 2SLS results, which is similar to the NESC results. The intermarriage
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income penalty is statistically significant in difference from zero from the OLS
and Heckman results and is negative and insignificant from the 2SLS results,
which is similar to the NESC results. The dummy variable for English speaking
country is negative and not statistically significant in difference from zero from
all three specifications. The years in the United States variable is still positive
but not statistically significant in difference from zero. Both assimilation
variables are not statistically significant in difference from zero, indicating that
adding the English-speaking immigrants to the sample diminishes the relative
importance of the assimilation variables for the wage equation. Most of the
coefficient estimates on the rest of the included independent variables are
similar to the NESC sample regression results.
6.

Specification Check: English-Speaking Immigrant Husbands
As an additional model specification check, I included a dummy variable
for the native English-speaking husbands of the endogamously married females.
The results in Table 9 in the Appendix do not show any major differences from
the previous specifications. Some results are worth addressing. The marriage
premium is still positive and significant from the OLS and Heckman results
and negative and not statistically significant in difference from zero from the
2SLS. It increases more than four times when the Heckman estimation is used.
The intermarriage premium is still negative but is not statistically significant
in difference from zero from the 2SLS results. The coefficient estimate on the
assimilation variable years in the US is statistically significant in difference from
zero only from the Heckman results. The coefficient estimate on whether the
immigrant female came from an English-speaking country is negative and not
statistically significant in difference from zero from all three specifications. The
dummy variable on whether the husband of the endogamously married female
came from an English-speaking country is negative and statistically significant
in difference from zero from the OLS results and positive and insignificant in
difference from zero from the Heckman and 2SLS results. This provides only
poor evidence on the effects of language on the assimilation dynamics and
earnings of immigrants.
7.

Further Discussion of Results
The differences between the Heckman method and the OLS are practically
small and are most likely due to the fact that the coefficient estimate on lambda
is not statistically significant in difference from zero. The Heckman results and
the 2SLS results differ significantly. On the one hand, this is due to the fact that
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they correct for different sources of bias, i.e. the Heckman procedure corrects
for selection bias while the 2SLS corrects for endogeneity.33,34 Both estimation
techniques provide consistent estimates in large samples. The Heckman results
are not as efficient as maximum likelihood estimates. The 2SLS have increased
variances and standard errors, which may explain the statistically insignificant
in difference from zero results. In addition, if the fit of the reduced form equation
is relatively poor, then 2SLS estimators will be still biased. The difference in the
results from the Heckman and the 2SLS procedures could also be reflective of a
poor choice of instruments for the 2SLS estimation. Given the shortcomings, the
Heckman results may be better estimates of the true population parameters. A
potentially superior estimation method will be a sample selection model with a
common dummy endogenous regressor in simultaneous equations. While this
estimation technique will allow us to tackle both sources of bias simultaneously,
it may be econometrically challenging. Particularly challenging aspects of this
estimation technique may involve establishing the sampling distribution of the
estimators and obtaining consistent and efficient coefficient estimates.
V.

CONCLUSION
This paper investigated whether female immigrants married to USborn spouses (i.e. exogamously married immigrants) have higher earnings
than female immigrants married to other immigrants (i.e. endogamously
married immigrants). I find that there is a marriage premium that is positive
and statistically significant in difference from zero even when I correct for the
labor force selection bias. One explanation for this premium could be that
married female immigrants have older children at home who can take care
of the household and release the burden on the mothers. This could make
these married foreign females more productive at work. In addition, I find that
exogamously married immigrants receive an intermarriage penalty. My results
show that there is a negative selection bias in the labor force among female
immigrants. In other words, higher human capital immigrants are not working
for wages. At the same time, among those who are working for wages, there is
a positive marriage premium and an intermarriage penalty. When I correct for
33 The 2SLS also corrects for simultaneity, or the fact that intermarriage can be both a cause and a result of
economic assimilation of immigrants.
34 The Heckman procedure deals with the problem that selection bias causes the error term to be correlated with
an explanatory variable (Kennedy, 2003). The Heckman estimates the probability of being in the labor force
first on the basis of a probit model and generates the Inverse Mills Ratio, which is used as an additional regressor
in the earnings equation (Gujarati, 22003). The Heckman estimator is consistent but not as fully efficient as the
maximum likelihood estimates (Kennedy, 2003; Kantarevic, 2004). 2SLS sweeps clean the dependent variable
of the influence of the error term by obtaining the estimator of Y from the reduced-form equation and then
replacing it in the original equation to produce consistent estimates (Gujarati, 2003).
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the endogeneity of the marriage decision, I find that that exogamously married
female immigrants still receive a penalty relative to exogamously married
immigrants. This premium is economically significant but not statistically
significant in difference from zero and no meaningful interpretations of it
can be done. The negative premium could be due to the fact that unlike their
exogamous counterparts, non-intermarried females do not enjoy the same high
husband’s income and husband’s social networks. Their motivation to perform
better on the job, therefore, could be stronger than that of the intermarried.
These results contrast the findings of Meng and Gregory (2005) and Meng
and Deurs (2006) for Australia and France, respectively, who find positive,
significant, and robust intermarriage premiums among immigrants. Kantarevic
(2004) finds a male intermarriage premium of about 2.5 %, which disappears
once the specification controls are introduced.
Given that the intermarriage literature is in its infancy, many interesting
empirical questions arise. In particular, further investigations of the marriage
premium among immigrant females could be done. Finding an alternative
estimation technique that will allow to handle both the selection bias and the
endogeneity simultaneously may be superior but econometrically challenging.
In addition, if data availability permits, the intermarriage premium could be
studied across different countries over time. Finding a different data might
allow for fixed and random effects, as well as adding occupational dummy
variables to account for some of the variation in the marriage premium.
The cross-generational effects, i.e. what happens to the premium in for the
descendants of the endogamously married and endogamously married females
are still questions that remain unanswered.
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Industry Structure Similarities,
Trade Agreements, and Business Cycle
Synchronization
Samuel Marll
Abstract
This paper analyzes the effects of industry structure similarities, free trade
agreements, and geographic borders on regional business cycle correlation,
using fifty US states, 10 Canadian provinces, and 1 Canadian territory as a
case study. Using two cross-sectional OLS regressions and one panel data OLS
regression, this study finds that pair-wise gross territorial product growth
correlation decreased significantly after NAFTA ratification for state-state,
province-province, and state-province territorial pairs, contrary to previous
literature’s results. NAFTA effectively decoupled intra-national business cycles
in the US and Canada while also desynchronizing cross-border pair-wise GSP
growth correlation, but cross-border pair-wise GSP growth correlation was
much less desynchronized post-NAFTA relative to intra-national pairs. These
results indicate that NAFTA and the US-Canada border may produce two
opposing forces that dampen each other’s desynchronizing effects.
Introduction
The United States and Canada have a unique economic relationship.
Sharing the longest unfortified border in the world, similar cultures, and a
common language, the two nations are each others’ largest trading partners.
US-Canada goods trade increased dramatically after 1988, when the CanadaUnited States Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) was ratified, eliminating tariffs
on most trans-border goods trade. 1994 witnessed the ratification of the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), superseding CUSFTA. NAFTA’s
immediate effects were to reduce or eliminate the majority of remaining tariffs
on motor vehicles, computers, textiles, agriculture, and other commodities
between the US, Canada, and Mexico. With tariffs and barriers removed, goods
trade in these sectors increased appreciably from 1994 to 2004, jumping 110.1%
over a period of ten years. As of 2007, exports and imports to and from the US
constitute 81% and 67% of total Canadian exports and imports, respectively,
while exports and imports from Canada comprise 23% and 17% of total US
exports and imports.
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This astronomical rise in US-Canada goods trade, spurred by advances
in North American economic integration, is hotly debated in Canadian policy
circles. Opponents of the two trade agreements argue that further economic
integration will tighten alignment of the Canadian business cycle with that
of the US due to increased trans-border goods flows and bind growth in
export-driven sectors of the Canadian economy to developments in American
markets. Blayne Haggart, a research analyst reporting to Canadian Parliament,
voiced concerns that “Greater economic integration will lead to the dissolution
of Canada (2001)”. The monetary economist Thomas Courchene also noted
in his empirical research that “We are witnessing the rise of ‘region-states’,
where geographic regions trade within their own area (2000)”. This scenario
culminates in Canada’s economic degeneration into a market integrally linked
to developments in US goods and asset markets.
Answering the question of whether trade agreements and industry
structure similarity synchronize regional business cycles would determine
whether North American trade integration is inextricably tying Canadian
goods markets to those of the US. This paper analyzes the effects of industry
structure similarity, the US-Canada border, and NAFTA ratification on
synchronicity of regional US and Canadian economic growth from 1984
to 2004. The analysis finds that GDP growth correlation at the state and
provincial level decreased significantly after NAFTA ratification. Agriculture
and mining industry structure similarities were found to have strongly positive
and statistically significant impacts on GSP growth correlation. Convergence
of industry structure similarity in these two sectors increases predicted GSP
growth correlation appreciably. Manufacturing industry structure similarity
was not found to be a statistically significant determinant.
Prior to NAFTA ratification, the border weakened predicted cross-border
pair-wise correlation by 31.4%. However, NAFTA and the border may have
produced two opposing channels that served to dampen the desynchronizing
effect. After NAFTA ratification, the border desynchronized cross-border
pairs by only 13.7%. NAFTA’s deregulatory effects may have spurred increases
in intra-industry trade volume between states and provinces that were not
possible between intra-national pairs.
Intra-nationally, NAFTA desynchronized state-state and province-province
pairs by 24.1%. The border dampened NAFTA’s desynchronizing effect to some
extent, with cross-border pairs’ predicted correlation coefficients reduced by
only 6.4%. The geographic border and NAFTA ratification negate each other’s
desynchronizing forces to some extent, leaving post-NAFTA intra-national
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business cycles much more strongly desynchronized than post-NAFTA crossborder business cycles. All regional business cycles were desynchronized, but
NAFTA impacted intra-national pairs much more strongly than cross-border
pairs.
Literature Review
In a theoretical context, the impact of increased goods trade on business
cycle synchronization is ambiguous. Assuming demand-side shocks drive
business cycles, inter-industry trade increases between country pairs should
channel the effects of these shocks from one country to another, leading to
an increase in business cycle correlation as trade increases. For example,
positive shocks to an economy could lead to increased income, subsequently
increasing demand for imports from another economy, accelerating economic
growth in the second country via export-led growth. The magnitude of the
shock’s transmission to the second economy would presumably be positively
correlated with the level of trade between the two.
This conclusion rests on the assumption that the increases in trade are
not intra-industrial, and that economies’ production structures do not become
more similar as a result. Krugman (1993) argues that as trade integration
progresses, countries specialize in production of specific outputs. Therefore,
trade integration that induces asymmetric industry specialization should
desynchronize business cycles. We can alternatively assume that shocks are
specific to distinct industries within the economy, which may have offsetting
effects.
If increases in trade are intra-industrial, and economies’ production
structures become increasingly similar as trade increases, then with business
cycles dominated by industry-specific shocks, trade integration that increases
intra-industry trade should lead to increased synchronization of business
cycles, due to the more symmetric response of economies to shocks. Frankel
and Rose (1998) assert that the nature of trade integration and international
trade can cause business cycles to converge or diverge. They argue that “closer
international trade could result in tighter or looser correlations of national
business cycles”. Per the Ricardian theory of comparative advantage, closer
inter-industry trade linkages could result in industry specialization, sensitizing
economies to industry-specific shocks, thereby leading to more idiosyncratic
business cycles. If intra-industry trade predominates, then industry-specific
shocks will create identical responses within economies, synchronizing
economic growth.
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Preferential trade agreements’ effect on business cycle correlation is a
topic that has been explored extensively by European economists, in the wake
of politicoeconomic integration on that continent. While this research has
extensively studied the ramifications of trade agreements and currency unions
for European and Asian markets, there is considerably less research detailing
trade agreements’ impact on US and Canadian goods markets. This paper fills
that gap by studying the effect NAFTA has on state-level economic growth
correlation and intra-industry goods trade.
Fiess (2007) employs OLS regression and spectral analysis to quantify the
degree of business cycle correlation between Central American nations and the
United States in the wake of the Dominican Republic-Central American Free
Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA). Using band-pass filtered annual data from
1965 to 2002 for 16 Central American nations, along with monthly data on
Central American industrial production for 1995 to 2002 (due to a scarcity of
reliable data for Central American economic activity), he determines the extent
to which Central American economies are synchronized. Fiess discovers that
Central American sensitivity to US economic activity has increased over time,
while the period of relative tranquility in the 1990s increased synchronization
within Central America. Using a cross-plot of bilateral exports to GDP ratios
and business cycle coherence, there no evidence of a positive relationship
between trade intensity and business cycle synchronization. Fiess’s paper
provides new information regarding the effects of free trade agreements on
developing countries, specifically those in the Central American region. His
OLS regression also provides a framework for analyzing the US economy’s
effect on other nations, and its effect on trade linkages between other country
pairs.
Böwer and Guillemineau (2006) analyze the extent of business cycle
correlation in the EU. Using extreme-bounds analysis (EBA), they examine
the transmission mechanism for increased business cycle synchronization
within the European Monetary Union. Using a vector of coefficients of bilateral
business cycle correlations for twelve euro area countries, they regress this
vector on an exogenous variable of interest with a varying set of 1-3 control
variables, along with gravity theory model variables. From there, they identify
extreme bounds by generating the lowest and highest values of confidence
intervals for the estimated parameter on the exogenous variable of interest. If
the low and high bounds on the interval have the same qualitative sign, and the
parameter estimate is significant in all regressions, the variable is regarded as
robust.
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They find a positive correlation between bilateral trade and the vector of
correlation coefficients, as well as for the bilateral trade to GDP ratio. Bilateral
trade only explains approximately 10% of GDP correlation. Trade openness is
found to have a positive but statistically insignificant effect on business cycle
synchronization. Trade specialization also fails to qualify as robust for the
1980 to 1996 period, but becomes robust for 1997 to 2004. The majority of
the impact on cycle synchronization appears to come from specialization in
machinery and transport equipment. They also find a negative relationship
between economic specialization and cycle correlation, but with a low R2 of the
regression, the authors conclude that similarity in relative shares of economic
specialization says little about cycle correlation. Böwer and Guillemineau
report that external trade is a key determinant of cycle synchronization for the
euro zone. They find an endogeneity effect for optimal currency areas: If trade
promotes co-movement of cycles, then a common currency that fosters trade
leads to increasingly synchronized cycles within the monetary union. Increases
in intra-industry trade also lead to increased synchronization, judging by its
status as a robust determinant of cycle correlation in the 1997-2004 period for
the extreme bounds analysis.
Chiquiar and Ramos-Francia (2005) analyze the effect of NAFTA on
commercial integration of industrial and developing countries—in this case,
the United States and Mexico. They analyze two components of this issue: First,
whether NAFTA enhanced business cycle synchronization between Mexico and
US, and second, whether increased competition from other countries (whose
main advantage is an abundance of unskilled labor) undermined synchronicity
of US and Mexican business cycles. The authors use spectral analysis,
cointegration tests, and Granger causality tests to examine this. The spectral
analysis focuses on manufacturing output behavior for the US and Mexico at
business-cycle frequencies. Using differenced logs of quarterly manufacturing
production indices for Mexico and the US from 1980 to 1993, they estimate
the coherence between these differenced logs. The spectral analyses find
statistically significant coherence estimates for bands of cycles with periods
from two to eight years. This corresponds to the average length of business
cycles. For 1996 to 2004, the coherence tests are run again, and coherences
are significantly stronger for the post-NAFTA period, implying stronger USMexico business cycle correlation, and more cointegrated manufacturing
production levels between the two nations.
Mexico-US cross correlation patterns in manufacturing output preand post-NAFTA are also analyzed. Tests indicate that before NAFTA
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implementation, cyclical movements in US output lead Mexico’s cycle by two
years. After 1996, that lag period decreased, indicating a shift to a non-lagged
contemporaneous correlation between manufacturing output cycles. The
authors find no evidence of cointegration for the pre-NAFTA period, but do
find evidence for cointegration in the NAFTA period. This suggests Mexican
cointegration with US manufacturing industries in the wake of NAFTA
implementation, leading to higher business cycle synchronization. Granger
causality tests indicate causation is unidirectional from US manufacturing
production to Mexico’s. Instead of examining US-Mexican output correlation
directly, Chiquiar and Ramos-Francia examine manufacturing synchronization,
an industry comprising a significant share of output for both nations. By testing
the extent of manufacturing industry correlation between nations, they can
determine how manufacturing shocks affect cycle synchronization for both
nations. Chiquiar’s paper explains how trade agreements impact a sector of the
intermediate goods market in North America. The methodology of this paper
hinges on the assumption that industry-specific shocks (in this case, shocks
to manufacturing) drive business cycle fluctuations. If cycle fluctuations are
demand-driven rather than industry-driven, the usefulness of this analysis may
be limited.
Cortinhas (2007) studies the effects of intra-industry trade and industry
specialization on Southeast Asian business cycle synchronization. He uses
annual data for real GDP of the five ASEAN nations from 1962 to 1996.
Cortinhas excludes post-1997 data, to avoid the East Asian financial crisis’s
distorting effects on the data. Initial OLS and 2SLS empirical results suggest
a positive correlation between intra-industry trade and cycle synchronization.
Cortinhas runs a second OLS regression, this time regressing the gap in real
output growth between country pairs on an index measuring intra-industry
trade. The parameter on intra-industry trade becomes negative, indicating
an increase in intra-industry trade will in fact reduce real output growth
gaps between ASEAN nations. This estimate is consistent with the positive
parameter on IIT in the first regression. Cortinhas then runs a second 2SLS to
control for endogeneity, using the same instruments as before, and finds that
the parameter on intra-industry trade is significant in synchronizing ASEAN
business cycles at the 1% level. Ultimately, Cortinhas concludes that intraindustry trade is a significant, robust variable in determining ASEAN cycle
correlation. He argues that the costs of joining a currency union in ASEAN
decreases as intra-industry trade increases.
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This paper uses OLS regression analysis to measure the effects of NAFTA
on the correlation of state and provincial level economic growth. Instead
of examining NAFTA’s effects at a macro level, this analysis uses state and
provincial data to capture the effects of physical distance, intra-industry trade
in agriculture, manufacturing, and mining, and the geographic border at a
microeconomic level. This model can be viewed as a variant of the gravity
model of trade, since it incorporates control variables for physical distance and
trade flows. The correlation coefficient of gross state product growth between
two territories is calculated for all possible pairs of 50 states, 10 provinces,
and 1 territory, generating 1,830 observations. This correlation coefficient is
regressed on variables including state/province population levels, distance
between most populous cities, exports as a share of gross state product, industry
structure similarity within the mining, agriculture, and manufacturing sectors,
and a set of dummies and interaction terms representing the geographic border
and NAFTA ratification. This methodology allows us to measure the effects of
NAFTA on not only state and provincial level economies, but also on sectors
of the economy producing highly tradable output, an approach not utilized in
the aggregate-level analyses of previous literature.
Methodology
The regression equation appears below:
ρ I, J = β0 + β1Agriculture Sector Similarity I, J + β2Manufacturing Sector Similarity I, J + β3Mining
Sector Similarity I, J + β4ln(Population I) + β5ln(Population J) + β6ln(Distance I, J) + β7Border I, J
+ β8NAFTA t + β9(Exports/GSPI) + β10(Exports/GSPJ) + ε I, J

ρ I, J is a correlation coefficient measuring the degree of linear association
between the GSP growth rate of state/province I and the GSP growth rate of
state/province J. With this dependent variable, we can measure the synchronicity
between territory I’s annual economic growth and that of all other territories.
Data was taken from the Bureau of Economic Analysis and Statistics Canada.
Provincial economic data is restricted to 1984 forward, so the scope of the
analysis is limited to the years 1984 to 2004.
The first three regressors are variables measuring the degree of industry
structure similarity between territory I and all other states and provinces, in
the agriculture, mining, and manufacturing sectors. Interstate export and
import data is not collected by US statistical agencies, so direct measures
of intra-national and intra-industry exports and imports as shares of states’
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GSP are infeasible. Using BEA and Statistics Canada data, we instead measure
industry structure similarities between territory pairs. For two given states
I and J, agriculture, mining, and manufacturing as a share of each territory’s
GSP are taken, and averaged over the time period in question, giving us six
separate values for states I and J containing their respective average shares of
agriculture, mining, and manufacturing for the time period.
With these six separate values, the values representing state J’s GSP shares
are subtracted from the values representing state I’s GSP shares, and then the
absolute value is taken, giving us 3 variables measuring, as a share of GSP,
the deviation in industry similarity between state I and state J for agriculture,
mining, and manufacturing. This set of deviations is computed between state
I and all 61 territories in the analysis. Trade theory states that as the deviation
between two territories’ industry as a share of GSP increases, their level of
intra-industry trade should decrease. With lower levels of intra-industry trade,
the two territories’ responses to industry-driven economic shocks become
increasingly asymmetrical. As a result, we expect the signs on these three
intra-industry trade variables’ coefficients to be negative.
Two population variables are also regressors. The first population variable
corresponds to the log of territory I’s average population over the time period
of the data set. The second population variable measures the log of territory
J’s average population over the span of the data set. Previous literature on
population’s effect on cycle correlation is scarce, but if increases in consumer
population generate higher demand for tradable output, intra-industry trade
volume will inflate and synchronize pair-wise territories. Additionally, more
populous territories should be more economically diversified, stabilizing yearly
GSP growth. This may affect cycle correlation with other territories. Thus, the
coefficients on the population vectors should be positive. The regression model
includes a distance regressor, corresponding to the log of the distance between
territory I’s most populous city, and the most populous city in territory J. The
gravity model of trade states that as the distance between territories increases,
the cost and time necessary to conduct goods trade increases, decreasing the
predicted amount of total trade. Therefore, we expect the distance regressor’s
sign to be negative.
The border dummy quantifies the effect of the geographic border on
business cycle correlation. Each entry in this variable corresponds to a pairing
between territory I and all other territories, registering “0” for intra-national
pairings, and “1” for pairings that cross the border. International finance
theory argues that border barriers such as tariffs, customs checkpoints, and
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trade restrictions reduce trans-border trade volume. With reduced levels of
intra-industry goods trade, industry-driven shocks will trigger increasingly
asymmetrical responses to state and province pairs. Thus, the coefficient on
the border dummy should be negative.
Two export variables were included, to estimate the effects of exportdependent economies on GSP correlation. The first export variable measures
international exports as a share of the first territory’s gross state product. The
second measures the same for the second territory’s GSP. As international
exports as a share of GSP increases, state and province-level economies’ annual
growth becomes increasingly variant, as fluctuations in the international goods
market accelerates or depresses export-led growth. If exports as a share of
gross state product increase, a state-level economy would become increasingly
tied to developments in other territories’ goods markets. Therefore, we expect
the coefficient estimates on these variables to be positive. International export
data for states was not recorded until 1999, so estimates for these variables are
restricted to the post-NAFTA regression.
The NAFTA dummy registers “0” for observations measured in the
1984-1993 pre-NAFTA dataset, and “1” for observations taken in the 1994-2004
post-NAFTA dataset. NAFTA’s primary effect was to eliminate all remaining
tariffs on tradable output in several sectors of the Canadian and US economies.
With intra-industry trade volume increasing in these newly deregulated sectors,
and assuming macroeconomic shocks are industry specific, we expect NAFTA
to increase pair-wise correlation coefficients.
These vectors are computed for every territory in the analysis, giving us
60 different sets of observations. These sets are then combined into one large
set of observations, creating a final group of nine regressors with 1,830 entries
each. See the following table for summary statistics of the variables.
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Pre-NAFTA (1984-1993)
Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Correlation i, J
0.397845
0.354456
-0.71519
0.981224
Agriculture Similarity i, J
0.026751
0.027623
1.85E-06
0.114372
Mining Similarity i, J
0.062572
0.085288
4.67E-06
0.348355
Manufacturing Similarity i, J
Ln (Distance i, J)
Ln (Population i)
Ln (Population J)

0.107517
7.418351
3.571408
4.296975

0.113824
0.775738
0.609343
1.31007

0.000192
2.755334
2.679153
2.679153

0.780746
9.142286
6.994147
6.994147

Post-NAFTA (1994-2004)
Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Correlation i, J
0.238658
0.360051
-0.81859
0.995907
Agriculture Similarity i, J
0.021462
0.021531
-0.00554
0.091592
Mining Similarity i, J
0.047482
0.066825
-0.01866
0.238547
Manufacturing Similarity i, J
Ln (Population i)
Ln (Population J)
(Exports/GSP i)
(Exports/GSP J)

0.071065
3.623514
4.339703
0.065764
0.125679

0.052567
0.605917
1.307634
0.046117
0.105129

-0.06749
2.687775
2.687775
0.010517
0.010517

0.290645
7.063507
7.063507
0.384355
0.384355

Pooled (1984-2004)
Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Correlation i, J
0.318252
0.365978
-0.81859
0.995907
Agriculture Similarity i, J
0.024106
0.024903
-0.00554
0.114372
Mining Similarity i, J
0.055027
0.076975
-0.01866
0.348355
Manufacturing Similarity i, J
Ln (Population i)
Ln (Population J)

0.089291
3.597461
4.318339
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0.090497
0.608108
1.308848

-0.06749
2.679153
2.679153

0.780746
7.063507
7.063507

Table 1. Summary statistics for the variables in the OLS analyses.
Conventional standard errors are insufficient for this type of
regression analysis. Heteroskedasticity in the error term is typical for crosssectional regressions dealing with state-level economic data. Additionally,
autocorrelation in the error term is a likely problem. Typically, serial correlation
is not a problem for cross-sectional data, as there exists no temporal pattern
within the residuals. However, spatial autocorrelation may be at work in the
residuals. If there is an economic component unique to a single state affecting
its GSP growth, all observations including that territory within the pair will
suffer from correlation of the residual term. Thus, spatial autocorrelation is
likely present. To simultaneously correct for heteroskedasticity and spatial
autocorrelation in the error term, heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation
consistent standard errors were employed.
Three separate versions of the regression were run. The first regression
dropped the entries with a “1” for the NAFTA dummy, giving us coefficient
estimates for the model prior to NAFTA ratification. The second excluded all
pre-NAFTA observations, giving the sample regression function for the postNAFTA era. Finally, a panel data regression was run, with all entries included,
allowing us to see the coefficient estimates for the overall time period of
1984 to 2004. With variation in the NAFTA dummy, the pooled regression
allowed estimation of the NAFTA dummy coefficient, quantifying NAFTA’s
synchronizing or desynchronizing effects on state-level business cycle
synchronization. To capture the effect of the border pre- and post-NAFTA, the
NAFTA and border dummies were interacted with each other, and included in
the pooled cross-sectional regression, creating the below regression model:
ρ I, J t = β0 + β1Agriculture Sector Similarity I, J t + β2Manufacturing Sector Similarity
I, J t

+ β3Mining Sector Similarity I, J t + β4ln(Population I t) + β5ln(Population J t) +

β6ln(Distance I, J) + β7Border I, J + β8NAFTA t + β9(NAFTA t * Border I, J) + ε I, J t

40

41

For the pre-NAFTA sample regression function, all parameters are
statistically significant at the 10% level, and all but manufacturing are statistically
significant at the 1% level. All parameter estimates, minus manufacturing, take
signs consistent with a priori expectations. The model explains a statistically
significant portion of the variation in GSP correlation, with variation in the
regressors explaining approximately 30% of the variation in GSP growth
correlation. The Durbin-Watson statistic for the pre-NAFTA OLS estimates is
calculated at 1.434. At n = 1,830 and with 8 regressors, we reject the null of no
autocorrelation in the residual term, indicating that the residuals may follow
an AR(1) process. The White test with cross terms confirms the presence
of heteroskedasticity in the residual terms. The LM statistic equals 293.402,
well past the critical value necessary to confirm unequal error variance. Since
these tests show that heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation are present with
conventional standard errors, the Newey-West standard errors resolve this
issue.
The empirical results for the regression model following NAFTA
implementation change drastically relative to the pre-NAFTA estimates.
The sample regression function explains a statistically significant portion of
the variation in GSP growth correlation at the 1% level, with variation in the
regressors accounting for approximately 16.1% of the variation in GSP growth
correlation. The adjusted R2 of this model is considerably less than the 0.30
adjusted R2 for the pre-NAFTA regression. The post-NAFTA regression’s
Durbin-Watson test produces a d-statistic of 1.617. As before, the presence of
an AR(1) process in the residual term is suggested, justifying use of the NeweyWest HAC covariance matrix. Inequality in the residual terms again seems
likely, as the LG test value is 204.842, well past the critical value necessary to
confirm heteroskedasticity in the original OLS residuals. The pooled model
explains approximately 23% of the variation in GSP pair-wise correlation, and
its Durbin-Watson and White test results again confirm the necessity of using
Newey-West standard errors in the panel data regression.
Agricultural sector similarity is the strongest trade determinant of preNAFTA cycle correlation, with a 1% difference in the agriculture share of GSP
between two territories weakening predicted cycle correlation by 1.55%. In the
post-NAFTA regression, agriculture industry similarity weakens as a strong
determinant of correlation, with the parameter estimate decreasing from
-1.546 to -0.849. The estimate remains statistically significant at the 5% level.
Agriculture structure similarity remains the strongest determinant of business
cycle correlation in the panel model as well, with a parameter estimate of
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-1.163. This estimate has a smaller magnitude than the pre-NAFTA estimate,
but remains larger than the post-NAFTA estimate.
Prior to NAFTA, mining industry similarity has a sizable effect on cycle
correlation, with a 1% increase in mining sector dissimilarity lowering predicted
growth correlation by 0.8%. Mining similarity weakens as a determinant of
correlation after NAFTA ratification, with the parameter estimate shifting
from -0.802 to -0.675, but remains statistically significant at the 1% level. The
panel data model’s mining similarity parameter estimate increases to -0.720,
compared to the post-NAFTA model’s estimate of -0.675.
Based solely on the pre- and post-NAFTA regression models, following
NAFTA ratification, industry structure similarities in agriculture and mining
weakened as determinants of state and provincial business cycle correlation.
Additionally, manufacturing became a statistically significant determinant
of cycle correlation in the post-NAFTA era. One possible explanation for
the reduction in agriculture and mining similarity’s effects on business cycle
correlation is that with increased economic integration between the US and
Canada in the form of reduced trade barriers and tariffs, the transmission of
industry-specific shocks was muted. Integration of goods and asset markets
may create a more effective shock transmission mechanism, allowing a more
complete dispersal of industry-specific shocks throughout all state-level
economies, regardless of the level of industry structure similarity. Therefore,
differences in agricultural and mining industry structure may not impact GSP
growth correlation as strongly.
Manufacturing similarity has a statistically significant and synchronizing
effect on states’ growth correlation. A 1% increase in the difference between
manufacturing as share of two states’ GSP increases the predicted value of
growth correlation by 0.12%. After NAFTA ratification, the parameter estimate
on manufacturing takes the expected negative sign, and becomes strongly
negative, with a 1% increase in manufacturing sector dissimilarity weakening
predicted synchronization by 0.9%. The manufacturing variable’s parameter
estimate decreases drastically from -0.990 in the post-NAFTA regression, to a
statistically insignificant -0.093 in the panel data model. The small magnitude
of the pre-NAFTA and panel estimates may indicate substantial market
segmentation in manufactures trade prior to NAFTA, if dissimilarity in this
sector only weakly impacts cycle synchronization.
NAFTA’s elimination of tariffs on motor vehicles, electronic products, and
textiles led to an appreciable increase in intra-manufacturing trade between
1994 and 2004. As the US and Canada witnessed a huge increase in trade
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volume in these outputs, it is reasonable to argue that the once-segmented
manufacturing sector became highly integrated, with substantial differences
in manufacturing industry structure now strongly impacting GSP growth
correlation. This would explain the shift in statistical significance and parameter
signage in the pre- and post-NAFTA model, as well as the negative parameter
estimate in the panel model.
Distance between the most populous cities has the expected substantial
effect on correlation, with a 1% increase in distance between largest cities by
territory weakening predicted correlation by 14%. Post NAFTA, the coefficient
estimate on the distance variable decreases in magnitude, shifting upwards to
-0.027. Following NAFTA ratification, physical distance between territories
within the US and Canada weakens substantially as a desynchronizer of business
cycle correlation. In the panel data model, the distance variable remains a
strong determinant of cycle correlation, with a coefficient estimate of -0.084
significant at the 1% level. With the technology boom of the 1990s, advances
in telecommunications and transportation technologies enabled cheaper and
faster transportation of tradable commodities, perhaps weakening distance’s
effect on business cycle correlation.
Prior to NAFTA ratification, both population variables are statistically
significant and positive at the 1% level as determinants of GSP growth
correlation. After 1993, the population parameters shift in value considerably.
The coefficient estimate on the population of territory I remains positive, but
decreases from 0.107 to 0.044, and is now statistically significant only at the
10% level. Territory J’s population strengthens as a determinant of business
cycle correlation, increasing to 0.104, and remains statistically significant at the
1% level. Within the pooled regression, the two population variables’ coefficient
estimates are statistically significant at the 1% level, with correct signage and
estimates close in value to those of the post-NAFTA estimates. Additionally,
their coefficient values lie within .01 units of each other, unlike the previous
regressions’ distance variables’ coefficients.
The post-NAFTA export variables produce contrasting results. Exports as
a share of GSP for state I were a statistically significant determinant of business
cycle correlation at the 1% level, with a 1% increase in exports as a share of
state I’s GSP increasing cycle correlation by 1.1%. However, exports as a share
of GSP for territory J was statistically insignificant at and beyond the 10% level.
The coefficient on this variable was -0.118, indicating that for a 1% increase in
exports as a share of territory J’s GSP, business cycle correlation between the two
territories weakens by 0.12%. These estimates imply that a state’s own exports
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as a share of GSP is more important in terms of its pair-wise synchronization
with other territories, relative to other territories’ exports as a share of GSP.
The pre-NAFTA border has a statistically significant and strong desynchronizing
effect on state and provincial level cycle correlation. The border weakens the
estimated value of pair-wise business cycle correlation by 20.5% in the preNAFTA time period. The border dummy remains statistically significant at
the 1% level in the post-NAFTA segment, and decreases in negativity to -0.18.
Following NAFTA ratification, the geographical border weakens slightly in its
capacity as a state-level desynchronizer. The panel model’s border coefficient
is the largest of all three border estimates. All regressors held constant, the
correlation of GDP growth between a province and a state is 31.4% weaker
than the correlation of GDP growth between two provinces or two states. The
negative parameter estimate on the NAFTA dummy indicates that post-NAFTA,
GSP growth correlation between all territory pairings, intra- and international,
decreases by 24.1%. Contrary to established literature, this analysis argues that
NAFTA had a significantly disaggregating effect on regional economies.
		 Interacting the border dummy with the NAFTA dummy produces a term
with a coefficient estimate of 0.177, statistically significant at the 1% level.
Multivariate calculus reveals how this interaction term affects the economic
interpretation of the border and NAFTA dummies. The partial derivative of
the sample regression function with respect to the border is:
δ ρ i, J / δ Border i, J = -0.314 + (NAFTA * 0.177)
		 Prior to NAFTA ratification, the correlation of GSP growth between a
province and a state is weakened by 31.4%, relative to an intra-national territory
pair. After NAFTA ratification, state-province GSP growth correlation weakens
by only 13.7%. NAFTA ratification mitigates the desynchronizing force of the
geographic border to some extent.
The partial derivative of the SRF with respect to NAFTA is:
δ ρ i, J / δ NAFTA i, J = -0.241 + (0.177 * Border)
		 NAFTA weakens intra-national pairs’ GSP growth correlation by 24.1%.
For state-province pairs, NAFTA weakens GSP growth correlation by only 6.4%.
While NAFTA had a highly desynchronizing effect on intra-national pairs, its
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effect is much weaker on state-province pairs. One valid argument against this
analysis is the question of whether a similarly important economic event in the
1990s strongly impacted US-Canada goods trade, and the NAFTA and border
dummies are simply absorbing that event’s effects into their estimates. While
the possibility exists that other events occurring from 1984 to 2004 impacted
pair-wise GSP growth correlation, the likelihood is that inter-territorial trade
is the main explanatory variable influencing pair-wise GSP growth correlation.
The scatter-grams on the following page corroborate this assertion. Within
these graphs, we clearly see a positive relationship between exports as a share
of GSP and business cycle correlation.
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Exports as a Share of Territory i's GSP
Figure 1. Scatter-plot of exports as a share
of state I’s GSP in relation to GSP growth
correlation. Note the positive trend in the
scatter-plot.
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Figure 2. Scatter-plot of exports as a share of
territory J’s GSP in relation to GSP growth
correlation. Here the trend is less clear, but
there remains a positive trend between the two
variables.
Conclusions
The border reduces cross-border pairs’ GSP growth correlation by
anywhere from 18% to 31%. Despite substantial trade integration, state and
province pairs’ GSP growth remains strongly desynchronized. Disparities
in taxation and trade regulations may remain, functioning as a disincentive
for trans-border goods trade. Home market bias may also influence US and
Canadian firms’ decisions to trade. The border’s geographic and legal effects
remain an obstacle to business cycle synchronization. Yet in relation to NAFTA,
the border had a synchronizing effect. Via partial derivative analysis, the border
increases the predicted level of cross-border pairs’ GSP growth correlation,
reducing NAFTA’s strongly desynchronizing effects. With the elimination of
virtually all economic barriers to cross-border trade, it is reasonable to conclude
that the doubling of goods trade between states and provinces over a ten-year
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period reduced NAFTA’s impact on business cycle correlation between states
and provinces. GSP growth correlation between cross-border pairs weakens
by 31.4%, prior to NAFTA ratification. Post-NAFTA, GSP growth correlation
between cross-border pairs weakens by only 13.7%. While NAFTA may have
desynchronized intra-national pairs, its effect is much weaker in international
pairings.
In the panel data regression, NAFTA alone was found to desynchronize
territory pairings by 24.1%. In a vacuum, this might be used as evidence to
argue the notion that free trade agreements are inherently desynchronizing.
The trade agreement may have had a desynchronizing effect by inducing states
and provinces to specialize in specific industries, per the Ricardian theory
of comparative advantage. With different territories specializing in different
industries, industry-specific shocks would no longer produce symmetrical
responses within state-level economies. It appears that NAFTA’s primary effect
was to generate simultaneous business cycle desynchronization between stateprovince pairs, state-state pairs, and province-province pairs. Though NAFTA
had the synchronizing effect of integrating multiple sectors of the goods market
of both nations, its desynchronizing effect also decoupled domestic economies
from within. NAFTA was ratified at the same time the border’s relevance as a
desynchronizing force was reduced, due to tariffs and trade barriers, coupled
with advances in transportation and telecommunications technology. These
two events opened up new markets for states and provinces with economies
centered on industries producing tradable output. As a consequence of the
Ricardian law of comparative advantage, states found themselves trading more
with provinces whose economic structures matched their own, and thus the
desynchronizing effects of NAFTA were reduced to some effect, although not
completely negated. This reinforces the notion that business cycle shocks are
industry driven, as opposed to demand driven.
One theory to explain the mechanisms of the post-NAFTA environment
is the following: NAFTA ratification lowered barriers to increased goods
trade, inducing territories to specialize in differing industries. As a result, the
NAFTA induced desynchronization between territory pairs. However, those
states specializing in identical industries witnessed such an increase in intraindustrial trade that a net synchronization was created in those pairs. Cycles may
be becoming more industry-driven, and what is being witnessed post-NAFTA
is the generation of industry cycles that territories are tied to. This theory
accounts for the regression results and the positive trend between exports as a
share of GSP and business cycle synchronization. At an aggregate level, NAFTA
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can desynchronize pairs by spurring trade specialization, but also induce
trade creation that creates industry-driven business cycle synchronization,
partially negating the decoupling. Post-NAFTA, GSP growth correlation both
intra-nationally and internationally has decoupled. Further empirical work is
forthcoming. Gravity model variables will be added, including transportation
expenditures as a share of two territories’ combined gross product. With this,
we can determine the effect transportation technology has on synchronizing
economic growth. More sectors of the economy producing tradable output will
be also be considered.
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The Genetic, Social, & Behavioral Factors
That Motivate Parents
to Abuse their Children
Brad Garner
Introduction
This paper examines the influence of economic, genetic, behavioral, and
social factors on the parental choice to abuse one’s child. I derive a choice
model for the parents based on McFadden’s (1974) conditional logit model.
Within society, the parent or parents not only bear the responsibility for their
child’s well being, but also for ensuring the child will grow up to be an educated,
productive member of society. Through the examination of individual parent
and child behavior patterns, as well as numerous social and economic factors
from the Physical Violence in American Families Survey of 1985, I show that
after a child behaves in a certain manner, the parent chooses to abuse based
on numerous social, economic, and genetic variables. Child abuse is a social
problem that has not been examined heavily in the field of economics, but with
the help of econometric analysis I examine how behavior and social trends
can increase the probability of child abuse. Hopefully this analysis will lead to
suggestions on how to remedy this problem.
In the next section I show how other studies have approached similar
problem and their findings. After the presentation of the literature I explain
my parental choice model and what factors influence this model. Following the
presentation of the model I discuss the data from the survey and what variables
were used and how they have been modified. I then use the data to support
my theory and conclude with a discussion about what factors influence the
parental choice to abuse.
Literature
Several scholars examine poverty and family economic status to see if
income level is a deciding factor in child abuse. These studies argue that lower
income levels increase parental stress level (as parents have a harder time
making ends meet), thus making parents more likely to use abuse (Berger 2004,
725-748; Drake and Pandey 1996, 1003-1018; Egeland 1979, 269; Gil 1970;
Iverson and Segal 1990; Medora, Wilson, and Larson 2001, 335-348; Straus
1979, 213). This is also confirmed by numerous studies which find that the
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presence of neglect is also highly influenced by poverty (Finkelhor and Jones
2006, 685-716; Paxson and Waldfogel 2003, 85-113). One can see that this is
a logical argument as poverty can lead to a higher parent stress level. Higher
stress levels may lead to loss in self-control, resulting in abuse (Herrenkohl,
Herrenkohl, and Egolf 1983, 424-431). My study examines multiple income
levels in order to see which ones are more prone to abuse.
Abuse history is another factor that is found to increase the risk that this
parent uses violence with their own children (Gil 1970; Iverson and Segal
1990; Straus 1979, 213). Other parental characteristics found to influence
abuse are: age, gender, family structure, education, ethnicity, and family
structure (Gil 1970). Substance abuse is another key factor that may increase
the probability of abuse occurring (Gil 1970; Markowitz and Grossman 1998).
Parental expectations for the child as well as parental understanding (or
misunderstanding) of child behavior are factors parents do control.
A child may behave in a certain manner, regardless of intent, and this act
or actions may be interpreted by the parent as negative behavior (Gil 1970;
Herrenkohl, Herrenkohl, and Egolf 1983, 424-431; de Lissovoy, Vladimir, Dr.
1979, 341). Parent reaction can be determined by numerous traits such as
those discussed earlier, but also variables such as personality which can not be
quantified accurately. Thus, the child’s behavior must also be considered in the
pool of variables that determine abuse (Lynch 1976, 43).
Mammen et al. (2003) examines how parental cognitions and satisfaction1
lead to child abuse. This study hypothesizes that parental expectations for the
child, inability to control parenting situations, and “hostile attribution bias”
(parents perceiving innocent child behavior as intentionally hostile) would all
lead to increased parental frustration and in turn child abuse (Mammen, Kolko,
and Pilkonis 2003, 288). The examination finds that none of these factors
contributed to aggressive parent behavior, suggesting that child maltreatment
is rather derived from parental satisfaction with the child (Mammen, Kolko,
and Pilkonis 2003, 288). This study suggests an interesting point about the
degree of abuse that is used. If a parent is more or less satisfied with their
child, they may be more likely to use higher levels of violence (dissatisfied), or
lower levels of violence (more satisfied), assuming the parent abuses. Egeland
(1979), presents the contradictory argument that inadequate mothers do not
understand their own children or the process of child development. If a mother
1 Parental cognitions considered by the study are unrealistic expectations for the child by the parent, if the parent 		
feels they have a lack of power in care giving situations (thus making them feel “threatened”), and if the parent 		
interprets innocent child behavior as malicious.  Satisfaction refers to how satisfied the parent is with the child.
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does not understand their own child, how can they understand the reasoning
behind a certain behavior?
In his construction of an equilibrium model for child development,
Akabayashi notes that parents may have lofty expectations for their children and
that the children may never live up to these expectations. The parents are then
forced to relieve their frustrations through abuse (Akabayashi 2006, 993-1025).
The construction of this model takes into account the child’s human capital, the
effort of the child, and the parenting strategy, all of which lead to a relationship
where the parent provides services to develop the human capital of the child
(Akabayashi 2006, 993-1025). Also taken into account is the amount of time
the parent spends with the child, which can lead to a more accurate perception
of child behavior, lessening parental frustration when a child behaves a certain
way (Akabayashi 2006, 993-1025). Agee, Crocker, & Shogen present a similar
model where abuse is a result of a loss of self control or loss of self composure
by the parent (Agee, Crocker, and Shogren 2004, 1-39).
The status (adopted, foster, etc.) of the child is another factor that should,
but does not seem to increase the probability of child abuse (Gelles and
Harrop, 1991). This study found, using empirical analysis of the National
Family Violence Survey, that non-genetic children were actually abused less
than genetic children (Gelles and Harrop, 1991). It is also interesting to point
out that abortion has led to a decline in child abuse rates. Assuming biological
children who are unwanted are more likely to be abused; abortion eliminates
this problem (M. P. Bitler & Zavodny, 2004; M. P. Bitler & Zavodny, 2002).
From the reviewed works it seems that there is a combination of factors,
rather than individual factors, leading to abuse. (Gil 1970; Straus 1979, 213).
Parental frustration with the child and the parents stress level are two factors
that should increase the probability of abuse. Each individual parent has a
different breaking point. Some parents snap under low levels of frustration or
stress and some parents are more patient. My study shows there is not only
a wide combination of factors, but that child behavior is the inciting factor
for the use of abuse. The literature reviewed demonstrates that numerous
environmental and genetic factors may come into play, but few demonstrate the
importance of behavior empirically. The studies presented here also emphasize
that the decision to abuse falls on the parent who is subject to numerous social
and genetic constraints. My study not only examines more environmental and
genetic factors, but also argues that the constraints on the parent influence the
decision to abuse when the child behaves a certain way. Unlike any other study
I also present a parental choice structure for the parent to abuse.
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Theory
Again, my question is: Given the presence of certain types of child
behaviors, what parental factors determine whether or not a parent will abuse
their child? My hypothesis is that certain factors exist; genetically, socially, and
behaviorally, for a given parent and a given child that increase the probability
of abuse. A key part of this argument is parental utility and the factors that
determine it. This is important as it allows me to present child abuse as a
derivation of McFadden’s conditional choice model. The utility of parent p (up)
is determined by not only by child utility (uc), but also by the child’s well being
(CWB), thus:
(1)
u = f (u , CWB )
p

c

Child utility is determined by the child’s happiness, as a child is happiness
translates to parental happiness (Akabayashi 2006, 993-1025). Child well being
is defined as the action by the parent which is in the best interest of the child.
An example of this is child vaccinations. Children may hate getting inoculated
for diseases such as polio, but it is necessary to prevent the child from
contracting this disease. I assume that children, especially the younger ones,
do not completely comprehend the difference between good and bad behavior,
as some children may find bad behavior utility maximizing. Assuming this
argument is true, parents can not always allow their children to maximize
their utility as it may be detrimental to the child as well as others. Abuse is
assumed to be detrimental to the child both in utility and in well being, thus it
is also detrimental to overall parental utility (Agee, Crocker, and Shogren 2004,
1-39).
Further, each parent faces a discrete choice, to abuse (a) or not to abuse (na),
and selects the choice that maximizes utility (Manski 2001, 217). Assuming that
the parents behave rationally they make the choice not to abuse:
			
		
(2)
But because child abuse does occur, some parents are not acting completely
rationally:
		
(3)
This is the probability that parent p has the utility function where abuse is the
optimal choice (Manski 2001, 217).
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Considering these assumptions, I now present the following decision
tree to illustrate the choice structure of the parent (Figure 1). Child behavior
is the first node on the decision tree. The child has two choices, good and
bad behavior. The behavior classification is determined by the parent, due
to the assumption previously mentioned about some children not knowing
the difference between good and bad behaviors. In reality there are shades
of gray with child behavior, but for this purpose I assume the parent sees it
either as good or bad. The parent must then decide how to act based on their
interpretation of the child’s actions. The parent has three choices: no response,
abuse, or other response (i.e. praise, or other punishment). Before I continue I
need to note that much of this decision is determined by parental perception.
The parent may see a child’s behavior as malicious, but when in reality the child
meant no harm (Mammen, Kolko, and Pilkonis 2003, 288).
The parent’s decision (PD) of what reaction to use, given the presence of a
certain type of child behavior (B), is defined by the function:

								

(4)

Where PP is parental personality, PE is parental expectations, PG is
parent gender, PA is parent age, CG and CA are the gender of age of the child
respectively, PAH is the parent’s abuse history, PAU is the parent’s alcohol use,
PR is the race of the parent, PI is parental income level, PES is the parent’s
emotional status, FS is the family structure, PPL is parental problems with the
law, PPS is the pregnancy status of the female parent, CI is the intentions of
the child from the parent’s perspective, and N is a variable representing other
factors in the parent’s life that are determined by nature. This can be expressed
in terms of McFadden’s conditional logit model.
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Before I present my choice model with this I must note that while
McFadden’s rational choice model may not make sense in this context as abuse
is not a rational choice, the basis of this model makes the most sense in this
context. Abuse is not always a choice parent’s consciously make, instincts and
other factors come into play. While this may hold true for the majority of
cases; I am attempting to show that when parents choose to abuse there are
factors that make the parent choose abuse, even if the choice is sub-conscious.
The following utility functions serve as the foundation for McFadden’s
conditional logit model and are derived from Manski (2001), Maddala (1983),
and McFadden (1974, 1980).
u (a )			
= u (c , p )
(5)
p

a

p

Equation 5 shows the utility for parent p ( u p (a ) ) when this parent
chooses to abuse their child can be expressed in terms of a vector of attributes
which characterize the child who is abused (ca), and a vector which classifies
the characteristics of the individual parent (pp) (Manski 2001, 217). However
one can only use observed values, thus the equation becomes:
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(6)

where cao and ppo represent the observed vectors for the abused child and
parent who chooses abuse respectively. In Equation 6 the error expresses any
unobserved attributes to utility (Manski 2001, 217).
Equation 6 can be transformed into a conditional choice probability
model:

(7)
						
Where Ao is the observed attributes of the abused child, including behavior.
This model shows the probability of parent p selecting the choice not to abuse,
given a set of child characteristics (Manski 2001, 217). Equation 7 leads to the
conditional logit model:
Y*pa= The level of indirect utility if a given parent chooses to abuse
Ypa = 1 If the parent chooses to abuse
Ypa = 0 otherwise
Using the previous equation I further assume:

Thus this becomes:

(Maddala 1983; McFadden 1974, 1980) 			
(8)
This equation is derived by McFadden and shows the probability that parent
p with attributes p, makes the choice to abuse given the child with attributes c
exhibits a certain behavior (B). From this conditional choice model I show that
when the parent decides to abuse, the decision is determined by a set of parent
and child characteristics. These characteristics should be present in parents
who consciously choose to abuse, and parents who “lose control” and do not
consciously choose to abuse their children. I also show the importance utility
plays in this model. Again, regardless of whether the parent consciously makes
the choice to abuse, parental utility from abuse is determined after the abuse
occurs.
Child behavior is the condition for this model. I believe the probability of
abuse increases when a child exhibits a negative behavior. Due to restrictions
in the data I am only to take into account three behaviors that have the good/
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bad distinction. It is important to note that the decision of how to react to
child behavior occurs only at time t, even though some of the variables which
affect this decision are determined at an earlier time. The three variables
are: if the child has a temper tantrum, if the child has disciplinary problems
at school, and if the child is failing school. Temper tantrums are defined by
the National Library of Medicine as “disruptive or undesirable behaviors or
emotional outbursts displayed in response to unmet needs or desires. [Temper
tantrums] may also refer to an inability to control emotions due to frustration
or difficulty expressing a particular need or desire” (Medline Plus 2008, 2). The
definitions of the other behavior variables are self explanatory. If the child has
temper tantrums or disciplinary problems at home it should signal good or bad
behavior, and also suggest if the presence of a certain behavior increases the
probability of abuse. The failing school variable tests if parental expectations
do factor into the use abuse. Summary statistics and cross tabulations for
these variables can be found in Appendix A. In order to determine how these
behaviors impact the explanatory variables, interaction terms were created.
Referring back to Figure 1, the parent’s decision has three outcomes
depending on the behavior. They are: no response, some other response (i.e.
praise or form of punishment that is not abuse), or abuse. If the parent chooses
abuse, they select from three forms: minor, severe or very severe. These are
defined as follows (Straus and Gelles 1990):
• Minor violence- threw something at another family member, pushed,
grabbed, shoved, or spanked.
• Severe Violence- kicked, bit, punched, hit or tried to hit with object,
beat up, choked, burned, scalded, threatened with a knife or gun, used
knife or gun.
• Very Severe Violence- Created to account for actions other than hitting
a child with an object (i.e. a belt) which is sometimes considered part
of traditional punishment
This decision is defined by a similar equation as the initial parental decision
(Eq. 4), only it now determines the type of violence on the condition that the
parent chooses to abuse.
Based on the assumptions of my model, parent’s do not want to abuse
their children as it is detrimental to both the parent and the child in terms
of utility and child well being. In the decision tree, the choice to abuse is the
least optimal given a certain child behavior. “No Response” is not the optimal
choice either as it does not reinforce good behaviors, or attempt to correct bad
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behaviors. Other is the optimal choice as it encourages good behavior through
praise, and corrects bad behavior through an optimal form of punishment.
However, as noted earlier many parents do not consciously make the choice
to abuse. This is where my theory about parents choosing to abuse based on
utility breaks down. While theory can not perfectly predict parental behavior,
my results show what characteristics modify the probability of abuse. I propose
that children, who are exposed to abuse, not only behave a certain way, but also
are raised by parents which have certain markers for child abuse.
In order to do this I predict multiple regressions. First I use a logit model as
my dependent variable is binary. The behavior interaction terms demonstrate
how certain independent variables change the probability of abuse, when the
behaviors are present. Summary statistics for the interaction terms that are
statistically significant from the non-interaction terms are in Appendix A.
The first set of predictions include my independent variables as well as the
significant interaction terms. I also present odds-ratios with this prediction.
Odds ratios are interpreted as difference from one, and show how the variables
affect the odds of abuse being present. After determining what factors affect
the probability a given parent chooses to abuse, I predict a second logit model,
ordinal in nature, to determine what type of violence the parent will use
(summary statistics in Appendix A). I use an ordered logit as my dependent
variable is ordinal in nature and it allows me to predict what characteristics,
including the behavior interaction terms, increase the likelihood of a parent
choosing a certain type of violence. The results of these predictions show
what characteristics increase the likelihood of a parent using a higher level
of violence. The cut-values demonstrate where the dependent variables are
divided for each level of violence. I now discuss my initial expectations for the
independent variables which are derived from reviewed literature as well as
cross-tabulations
I expect the gender of the respondent variable to be positive, signaling that
females are be more likely to abuse. This is grounded in the idea that females
spend more time taking care of children, creating more opportunities to abuse
than males. I predict the age of the respondent to be negative, as younger
parents are less experienced and turn to abuse as a disciplinary solution
than more experienced parents. I expect child age to be negative, as younger
children are more likely to be abused as they require more care from the parent
as increased needs may cause parental frustration, thus leading to abuse. The
cross-tabulations show that as child age increases the number of abuse cases
decreases. This also may be due to the fact older children can defend themselves
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more effectively. Parent age and child age are somewhat correlated as younger
parents most likely have younger children. I expect child gender to be negative,
signaling male children are more likely to be abused, as male children are more
prone to bad behavior. The behavior interaction term is not significant from
the non-interacted gender variable. This demonstrates that behavior is a factor
in the non-interacted term, asserting my initial expectation.
I so not expect parents who were exposed to domestic violence as a child
to be more likely to abuse. I think domestic violence breeds more domestic
violence, not more child abuse. If the respondent was abused by either of their
parents when they were children, I expect the respondent to be more likely to
use abuse. This is derived from the idea that abuse lead to more abuse. If the
respondent has been arrested in the previous year there are two possibilities: the
parent is in jail, away from the child, and unable to abuse; or because the parent
has broken the law, they may be more violent than other parents. A former
convict as a parent may also have missed a significant portion of a child’s life
and this could increase parental frustration. There are two possibilities with
alcohol consumption: parents either become more violent under the influence
or more tolerant depending on the manner in which alcohol affects them. The
cross-tabulations show that there are more cases of abuse than non-abuse as
the number of drinks per day increases.
Asserting the beliefs of the literature I believe that parents who feel
stressed, depressed, or have thought about suicide are more likely to abuse
as stress is a factor that may cause parents to snap, leading to more abuse. I
also have parallel expectations with the literature when it comes to income
levels. I predict that lower income levels should increase the probability of
abuse. For the race variables, I could argue minority races are more or less
likely to abuse, but there is no plausible theory to support either argument. I
think the results of the race estimates may be proxies for other variables that
have not been included in this model, such as education level and employment
status. If the respondent is pregnant I expect a higher probability of abuse,
as pregnant women are assumed to be under more stress (physically and
emotionally) than other parents and therefore be more likely to turn to abuse.
Unlike the reviewed literature, if the family is a step or single parent family, I
expect to see a positive relationship. I expect this with step families because
one parent is not biological and may be more likely to abuse a child that is not
theirs. Single parent families typically struggle to make ends meet; therefore,
my reasoning for this is similar to my argument for income level. Finally, with
the child behavior interaction terms, I expect these to show that parents with
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certain characteristics to be more likely to abuse their child given the presence
of a certain child behavior.
Data
The ideal data for a study such as this would be statistics about every case of
child abuse and the environments in which each case occurred. While this data
is over twenty years old, I do not feel this makes a difference. Unfortunately,
some variables that may make a parent use abuse, such as emotion, are not
easily quantified. I believe that the genetic and demographic variables that
contribute to abuse have not changed significantly over time. Since child
abuse is an illegal activity, data only exists about reported cases, I examine
those cases to see if there are any consistencies among cases.
The data come from the 1985 Physical Violence in American Families
Survey. This survey was a follow up to a similar survey done in 1976. “The
main component of this survey design was a national cross-sectional survey
of adults in the United States who either (1) were currently married or living
together, (2) were single parents with children under 18 in the household, or
(3) had been married or had lived with a partner of the opposite sex within the
past two years” (Codebook). The dependent variables are considered Conflict
Tactics Scale Violence Rate Variables which are divided into three types
of violence, minor, severe, and very severe (Straus and Gelles 1990). These
variables were manipulated to create a single variable, if abuse was present at
all regardless of type, and a scale variable for the type of violence. The majority
of the independent variables are dummy variables denoting either specific
responses (i.e. 1=female and 0=male) or certain levels, such as income and the
amount of drinks people consume. Again, more in depth data definitions are
contained in Appendix A.
The data do present some limitations in my attempt to produce results.
The survey has 6,002 observations. With the numerous manipulations of the
data, some variables lack significant observations to be considered accurate.
This is reflected in the dependent variables. Out of the people who answered
the abuse questions, 60% said they abuse. This is possible, but I feel with more
observations, this number might decline. Survey form also naturally draws into
question the validity of the answers. People could easily give false answers and
I see some examples of this present in the summary statistics. I find it highly
unlikely someone can consume 40 drinks in one day. Thus, the results produced
in this study must be interpreted with caution. This survey is one of the better
sources of statistics that show the factors that contribute to child abuse. No
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other survey has the depth of possibly significant independent variables than
this survey. It provides a more accurate picture when the independent and
dependent variables are each from the same source.
From the summary statistics table in Appendix A I find the majority of the
independent variables have upwards of the 6,002 observations. This is important
as a relationship is established from the 3,338 observations for the dependent
variables. The reasons for the significantly lower number of observations
for the dependent variables is due to the fact there were numerous missing
observations in the study. This occurs when the answer was “unknown” as
opposed to “no” or “yes”. It should be noted that numerous dummy variables
were generated. The stressed, depressed, thought about suicide, income, race
and family status variables all had to be converted into dummy variables for the
different responses on the survey.
Results
The results for the initial model, determining what characteristics predict
the probability abuse is present, is divided into three separate predictions.
These results can be found in Table 1 (Standard errors in parenthesis, *denotes
significance at 10% level, **denotes significance at 5% level, ***denotes
significance at the 1% level, OR: odds ratio: maintains same significance as
coefficient estimate)2. The first model (1) is my prediction with the temper
tantrum (TT) interaction terms. The second model (2) is the prediction with
the failing (FS) school interaction terms. Finally, the third model (3) is the
model with the disciplinary problems (DP) at home interaction terms. The
interactions terms demonstrate the effect of the given characteristic with the
presence of the given behavior. The effect on the odds ratio is also reported.
For interpretation purposes the closer the odds ratio is to 1, there is little or no
change.

2

Note – both of the coefficient estimates for interactions terms for Hispanic and drinks per day were statistically
significant in difference from zero at the 10% level.  Both being Hispanic and consuming more drinks per day
lowers the log-odds for abuse, holding constant the influence of other variables.  These estimates are not very
reliable, but are interesting especially the one concerning alcohol use, as it supports the idea parents may be
more tolerant given a certain child behavior.
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These results provide some interesting answers to my initial hypothesis.
All models are statistically significant, as can be seen from the LR-stat. Each
model also has a Pseudo R2 of about .1. Each model also predicts about 70%
correctly. I find across the models there are some variables which consistently
contribute to a change in the probability that a parent abuses. These variables
are important as they signal that a parent’s probability of abuse changes
regardless of the presence of certain behaviors. All of the following estimates
are statistically significant in difference from zero (most at the 1% level of
significance), across all models, they are:
• Parent Gender (positive) - being female increases the log-odds of
abuse by about .4, holding constant the influence of other independent
variables. Being female also increase the odds of abuse by about .5.
This is parallel with initial expectations.
• Parent Age (negative) - for each additional year of age, the log-odds of
the parent using abuse decreases by about .019, holding constant the
influence of other variables. As the parent gets older the odds of abuse
decrease by .02 for each year. This is on par with a priori expectations
that younger parents are more likely to abuse.
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Child Age (negative) – for each additional year of age, the log odds of
the child being abused decreases by about .91, holding constant the
influence of other variables. The odds-ratio decreases by about .09,
for each additional year in age the child gains. This is also consistent
with initial expectations that younger children are more likely to be
exposed to abuse.
• Child Gender (negative) - being a female child, instead of a male,
decreases the log-odds of abuse by about .092, holding constant the
influence of other variables. If the child is female, the odds of abuse
decrease by about .09. This agrees with initial expectations that males
are more likely to be abused.
• Abuse History (positive) - if a parent was abused by their own parents
as a teen (as opposed to not being abused), mother or father, the logodds of abuse increases by about .3, holding constant the influence
of other variables. If a parent was abused by their own parents, the
odds of abuse increases by about .34. This is consistent with a-priori
expectations.
• Depression (positive) - if the parent has ever felt depressed, as opposed
to never feeling depressed, the log-odds of abuse increase by about
.3383, holding constant the influence of other variables. If the parent
is depressed the odds of abuse increase by about .4. This was my initial
expectation as well.
These coefficient estimates for these variables demonstrate that there are
certain factors outside of one’s control that serve as markers for a parent to abuse.
These results demonstrate that the biological and family history factors that
influence a parent’s choice to abuse no matter how the child behaves. I now present
the statistically significant interaction terms from the first set of predictions.
I am only discussing the interaction estimates that are statistically
significant in difference from zero at the 5% level of significance or better:
• Child Age (Discipline Problems Interaction) – In children who have
disciplinary problems at home; each additional year in age decreases
the log-odds of abuse by about .17, holding constant the influence of
other variables. Also for each year older the child with disciplinary
problems is, the odds of abuse decrease by .164. This is again
consistent with initial expectations that younger children, especially
those with disciplinary problems are more likely to be abused.
• Respondent’s Mother hit their Father (Failing School Interaction) If the parent’s mother hit the parent’s father and the child is failing
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school, the log-odds of abuse decreases by 1.192, holding constant the
influence of other variables. This may not be an accurate prediction,
due to a small sample issue. There are only 28 observations where
abuse was present and the respondent’s mother hit the respondent’s
father.
• Abuse History (Hit by Father – Failing School interaction) - If a parent
was abused by their father and the child is failing school, the log-odds
of abuse increase by 1.329, holding constant the influence of other
variables. Also if a parent was abused, and has a child failing school
the odds of abuse increase by 2.778. These results are parallel with
initial expectations and somewhat higher than the non-interacted
term. This may reflect the parental expectations concept.
• Low Income ($0 to $10,000 – Temper Tantrum Interaction) – If the
family does not make more than $10,000 and the child has a temper
tantrum, the log odds of abuse increase by 2.19, holding constant the
influence of other variables. If a parent makes less than $10,000 and has
a child that acts out, the odds of abuse increase by 7.937. This is the only
time any income estimate is statistically significant. I find that income is
only a factor when the child misbehaves or annoys the parent, assuming
temper tantrums are perceived in this way by the parent.
• Parent Stress Level (Failing School Interaction) – If a parent feels
stressed and has a child failing school, the log-odds for abuse increase
by 2.33, holding constant the influence of other variables. These
conditions also increase the odds of abuse by 9.314. This is the only
time the stress level of the parent was significant, showing that certain
behaviors (i.e. failing to meet expectations) may trigger a parent to
abuse when they are stressed.
From these significant interaction terms; I find that when a child behaves a
certain way or fails to meet parental expectations, there are other factors (besides
the previously discussed biological factors, which change the probability that a
parent chooses to abuse. Now that I have shown what factors lead a parent to
choose abuse, what factors influence the decision as to what type of violence to
use?
The results of the interacted ordered logit models are presented in Table
2 (Standard errors in parenthesis, *denotes significance at 10% level, **denotes
significance at 5% level, ***denotes significance at the 1% level). These models
show what variables influence a parent’s choice to use minor, severe, or very
severe violence.
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All three of these predictions are statistically significant in difference from
zero with pseudo R2’s around.06. From the interacted ordered logit predictions
I find the following coefficient estimates of non-interacted variables to be
statistically significant in difference from zero across all three models (All of
these estimates are statistically significant in difference from zero at least at the
10% level):
• Parent Gender (positive) – Being a female parent, as opposed to
being a male parent, increases the probability that that parent turns
to a higher level of violence, holding constant the influence of other
variables. Females are not only more prone to abuse but also more
prone to use higher levels of violence.
• Parent Age (negative) – As the parent gets older, the probability the
selected parent uses higher levels of violence decreases, holding the
influence of other variables constant.
• Child Age & Child Gender (negative) – As the child gets older, the
probability they are exposed to higher levels of violence decreases,
holding constant the influence of other variables. If the child is
female, the probability that child is found in higher violence category
also decreases, holding constant the influence of other variables.
• Abuse History (positive) – Parents who were abused by either parent
as a teenager are more likely to use higher levels of violence, holding
the influence of other variables constant.
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Race of the Parent: Black (positive) – If the respondent is AfricanAmerican they are more likely to use higher levels of violence, holding
constant the influence of other variables.
• Depression & Attempted Suicide (positive) – If a parent is depressed
or has thought about killing themselves, that parent is more likely to
use more higher levels of violence, holding constant the influence of
other variables.
I again find many genetic and family history variables to be influential in
increasing or decreasing the probability that higher violence levels are present.
Many of the variables which determined the probability a parent uses abuse also
determine the probability for a certain level of violence. Race and Depression
have also come into play here. Race is another genetic trait that can not be
controlled but may be serving as an indicator for income or education here.
After checking correlation between race and other variables, I only found that
race is somewhat correlated with low levels of income. One could easily argue
that depression could be a predetermined disorder or a result of events in ones
life. Either way, I expect this variable to make a parent more violent. I now
present the significant coefficient estimates for the interacted variables.
The following variables are all interaction terms; showing how the presence
of child behavior affects the decision of what type of abuse to use. All are
significant at least at the 10% level of significance.
• Parent Age (Temper Tantrum & Failing School Interaction) – When a
child either has a temper tantrum or fails in school, each year older the
parent is increases the probability that the parent uses higher levels of
violence, holding constant the influence of other variables. Younger
parents are more likely to abuse and use higher levels when behavior
is not considered, yet when behavior is a factor, the older parents are
more likely to use higher levels of violence.
• Domestic Abuse Experience (Failing School Interaction) – I again
find a contradictory relationship when behavior is factored in. In the
failing school model, if the respondent’s mother hit their father, this
parent is more likely to use higher levels of violence, holding constant
the influence of other variables. However, parents who have had this
experience along with children who are failing school, are actually
likely to use lower levels of violence of none at all. Again, I think this
is a small sample issue.
• Abuse History (Failing School Interaction) – A parent who was
abused by their father and has a child who is failing school is more
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likely to use higher levels of violence, holding constant the influence
of other variables. This is again consistent with initial expectations
about abuse history.
• Stressed (Failing School Interaction) – Parents who feel stressed
and have children who are failing school are more highly likely to
use higher levels of violence, holding constant the influence of other
variables. This is consistent with initial expectations.
• Child Failing School (negative) – Children who are simply failing are
subjected to lower levels of violence or no violence, holding constant
the influence of other variables.
The coefficient estimates for these statistically significant interaction
terms demonstrate that behavior, especially if the child is failing in school,
can dramatically alter what factors go into determining the level of violence
choice the parent faces. While some of the variables are genetic, or based
on experiences which could not be controlled; the interaction terms again
demonstrate that factors such as stress factor into the decision about what kind
of abuse a parent uses.
Interpretation of Results
From the results I find, based on the data from The Physical Violence in
American Families Survey of 1984, the decision to abuse is based primarily
on genetics and abuse history. Factors such as age and gender, both of the
parent and the child, seem to be important factors in determining if parents
abuse. Younger parents have younger children, and are less experienced. Also
younger children can be a handful for these inexperienced parents and people
have been known to snap when overwhelmed with frustration. Parental anger
with a difficult child, sometimes results in abuse (Frude and Goss 1979, 331).
Abuse history played a role in not only determining abuse, but also what kind
of abuse, and how intense that abuse would be when interacted with certain
child behaviors. Children learn how to be parents from their own parents and
if a child is abused, it makes sense that it would be more likely to use abuse also.
This relationship is parallel with a priori expectations. It is also important to
note, mental illness, regardless of cause, is a factor that increases the probability
of abuse.
While the genetic and family history variables play a role in almost every
case of abuse, the impact of behavior also plays a role. The reviewed literature
expected parental stress and income would be a factor in determining abuse.
I conclude that stress and lower levels of income determine the presence of
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abuse, when certain behaviors are present. These two increase the odds of
abuse significantly. Both the temper tantrum and failing school behaviors not
only determined what factors increase the probability of abuse, when one of
these behaviors are present, but also what type of abuse was more likely to be
used. This demonstrates a certain child behavior, which can occur randomly
such as a temper tantrum, increases the odds the parent uses abuse. Parental
expectations play a critical role as well; this can be seen from the number of
significant coefficient estimates for the failing school behavior. The coefficient
estimates for the failing school interaction terms demonstrate that failing
to meet parental expectations not only increases the probability the child is
abused, but also the probability the child is exposed to a higher level of violence.
I initially underestimated the role of parental expectations.
One factor I thought would increase the probability of a parent using abuse
was alcohol consumption; however, it was never significant in any model. This
demonstrates that alcohol may not be a determinant in child abuse, but possibly
in numerous other problems. I expected income as well as family status to also
play a larger role, which they did not. This could be due to the fact that lower
income families are more likely to abuse with the presence of temper tantrums.
I thought a similar relationship would occur with the family status variables.
This study has produced some interesting, albeit possibly inaccurate
results. However, I find that there are certain genetic markers which trigger
abuse, and there are numerous social variables which affect the decision to
abuse and the choice of abuse type when a certain child behavior is present.
Conclusions
The goal of this paper was to examine the parental decision structure for
child abuse. My initial hypothesis was that a child would behave, the parent
would be forced to respond, and the decision to abuse would be based on social
and genetic factors within the parent’s life, as well as the manner in which the
parent’s perceived the child’s behavior. I used McFadden’s (1974) conditional
logit model as a basis for my theory to show that the decision to abuse is
based on factors both in the parent’s life and in the child’s life. I followed this
with interacted logit and interacted order logit models, which used data from
the Physical Violence in American Families Survey from 1984, to show that
numerous biological and family history variables determine abuse regardless
of behavior. The social variables such as stress, were found to increase the
probability of abuse when the child behavior is considered.
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Thus, I conclude that given the difficulty associated with predicting a
problem as great as child abuse there is no specific set of variables which define
an abuser over a non-abuser. There are only markers, which signal who may
be more at risk to abuse. The decision to abuse is likely a snap judgment made
by the parent. Parents probably do not premeditate abuse. As noted in the
literature it is a combination of factors that triggers abuse. There are biological
markers such as gender and age which put certain parents and certain children
at higher risk than others. A parent who abuses is pushed to their limits by a
certain child behavior or some other factor. I have found certain factors which
are present in the abusing parent’s life. A suggestion for further study would
be to examine the effects of child abuse on children, for example if it increases
the risk of teenage pregnancy, psychiatric disorders, or involvement in crime
(Afifi, Brownridge, and Cox 2006, 1093-1103; Currie and Tekin 2006; Smith
1996, 131-142; Smith and Thornberry 1995, 451-481).
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Appendix A
Variable Definitions of Independent Variables:
Gender of Respondent, Male=0 Female=1
Age of Respondent, Age must be equal to or above 18
Child Age- child must be under the age 18
Gender of Child, Male=0 Female=1
Respondent Father hit Mother, 0=No, 1=Yes
Respondent Mother hit Father, 0=No, 1=Yes
Respondent Arrested in previous year, 0=No, 1=Yes
Respondent Alcohol Use- measured in drinks per day
Black- respondent is African American, 1=yes, 0=no
Hispanic- respondent is Hispanic, 1=yes, 0=no
Other-respondent is other race, 1=yes, 0=no
Income variables, 1=respondent falls in specified category of income,
0=respondent does not fall in respective category
Stressed, 0=never felt stressed, 1=includes if respondent ever feels stressed
Depressed, 0=never felt depressed, 1=includes if respondent ever feels
depressed
Thought about suicide, 0=never thought about suicide, 1=includes if
respondent ever thinks about suicide
Respondent hit by mother as teen, 1=yes, 0=no
Respondent hit by father as teen, 1=yes, 0=no
Woman Pregnant, 1=yes, 0=no
Family Status, 1=respondent falls in specified category of family status,
0=respondent does not fall in respective category
Child Behavior Variables, 1=child has exhibited behavior, 0=child has not
exhibited behavior
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Summary Statistics of Independent Variables:
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Summary Statistics for Significant Interaction Terms (TT= Temper Tantrum,
FS=Failing School, DP=disciplinary problems at home):

Summary Statistics for Dependent Variables:
Abuse, 1=abuse was present, 0=otherwise
Abuse Type, 1=minor violence, 2=severe violence, 3= very severe
violence,
0=otherwise
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Cross-Tabulations of Independent Variables
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Cross-tabulation of Child Age

Cross-Tabulation of Respondent Drinks per Day
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Cross Tabulations of Selected Interaction Terms
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A Current Microeconometric Assessment
of the Racial Wage Gap in the United States
By David Krisch

I. Introduction
Minority groups in the United States promoted affirmative action legislation
in the 1960s during the civil rights movement to help ease the inequalities
suffered in their economic history. Many labor economists have sought since
this time to study the effects of race, gender, and the effect of income – how it
has changed and if the gap has closed. Existing literature uses many different
econometric models to show how the effects of race, gender, age, occupation,
educational attainment, and geographic location on an individual comparative
basis. This paper will examine the effects of all of these variables jointly using
an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis.
Does race effect income according to the 2005 American Community
Survey (ACS)? The ACS is 1 in 100 national survey that encompasses over
1.1 million households and 2.878 million individuals (Steven et. al.). Using
multivariable OLS regression of such data will yield results that will provide
an overall snapshot of the state of the modern labor economy and identify
what problems our society has to economically overcome if an income gap
between white males and minority groups still exists. Many other researchers
have answered a similar question, however, the link between these variables on
broad current level has not been drawn.
Many economists since the enaction of affirmative action have examined
the effects of many different factors that influence income. Two major labor
economists, Jacob Mincer and Peter Blau pioneered modern understanding
of income labor economics that inspired further labor analysis. The major
contribution of Mincer was to connect the modern theory of human capital to
empirical survey data on income, and apply it to labor force inequality (Rosen
159). Mincer using a semi-log transformation analyzed the gender gap problem
in the 1960s and 1970s by examining disparity among educational attainment
(Rosen 159) (Bloom et.al. vi). This will be important in reviewing the results
of the regression analysis, the use of showing how human capital will affect
current data (apposed to the previous analysis that was rendered by Mincer),
and the connection of the wage gap that will encompass both race and gender.
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Blau’s theory of status attainment describes that one can achieve a high
social status (which is a measure of income economic status) by having an
occupation which is associated with a higher economic benefit (Guan et. al.
115). Directly linked to cultural and individual microeconomic characteristics
is higher social attainment (Guan et. al. 115). This theory will be used in
conjunction with Mincer’s work of human capital income analysis to both
review current labor economics wage gap analysis and lay the framework for
the economic model used in this paper (Guan et. al. 115).
Other literature examines the regional wage gap with particular focus on
race. Bisping and Fain (2005) examine the theory of a labor queue, which orders
demographics in terms of employer favorability on a regional and national level
(Bisping et. al. 352). The results of this study show that there is no change in
the order the labor queue and there is no significant change in the ordering
of the queue on a national level (Bisping et. al. 358). In some specific regions,
however, the existence of a racial gap appears eliminated (Bisping et. al. 358).
More recent wage gap analysis by Baumann (2005), examines using the
Integrated Public Use Microdata Census project (IPUMS), if there has been a
shift in the wage gap using time series data, specifically in Appalachian region of
the United States (Baumann 416). This is in response to the historical evidence
that suggests that individuals who live in this region have lower wages when
compared to the rest of the country (416). The findings of this study show
that the wage gap between the Appalachian region and that of the rest of the
country has only decreased slightly from its level in 1970 to its level in 2000
(439). The focus of the econometric model in this paper will depart from the
comparative nature of a shift in the wage gap over time, but focus on whether
this gap currently exists between all races in geographic regions.
Further race-gender wage gap studies conducted recently narrow the
specific hypothesis. Saunders (1995) examines the wage gap that exists on
a regional, racial, gender, and occupational levels (Saunders 68). Findings
indicate that black men average income decreased, while white men’s average
income increased over a ten-year period from 1979 to 1989 (68). Saunders’
findings also indicate that black women gained ground when compared to
white men (68). This is a refinement of the models previously discussed, but
when examining the income gap between women, the same results are found
then when comparing different races (69).
Antecol and Bedard (2002) conclude that minority women make
substantially less than that of their white counterparts (Antecol 122). Neal
81

(2005) also supported this finding but insists that the wage gap is much higher
then that was previously found in earlier analysis, such as the one conducted by
Antecol and Bedard (Neal S1). The use of panel data in Neal’s analysis and its
inclusion of non-labor force individuals is the source of the underestimation of
the wage gap (S3). This analysis will depart from Neal’s method by examining
only participants in the labor force market. These studies show how the Blau’s
theory of status attainment can relate to differing groups of minorities, while
the differing human capital between gender and races support Mincer’s theory
of the connection between modern human capital and income.
Many economists have conducted studies looking at a number of different
factors that influence income, but the analysis in this paper will seek to combine
a number of different factors to give a general overview of the racial gap on
differing regional levels. Marital status, age, region, occupation, gender, race,
number of hours worked, and educational attainment all will be combined in
OLS regression analysis to find whether such a gap still exists from 2005 ACS
data. This is a departure from previous literature because of the larger scope
of the analysis and current data for a more updated snapshot of the state of our
economic equality.
Section II, Modeling and Data, contains the economic multivariable model
that will be used in regression, how the hypothesis of the effects of race will be
tested, description of the statistical properties of the ACS data variables used
for this analysis, and how such data could influence the results. Section III,
Empirical Results, will seek to explain the findings of the regression analysis.
This section provides graphical analysis of the variables on a comparative level
as well. Section IV will conclude with an overview of the findings and the
impact of such findings.
II. Modeling and Data
The hypothesis that is being tested by this model is that: income has a
negative (or equal) relationship to minority groups among differing geographical
regions, educational attainment, marital status, occupation, gender, and age.
The primary focus will be on regional affects, however, there will be a need
to look at the influence of the other variables in order to truly understand the
problem of income inequality in totality.
Evidence would support from the previous research that there is
correlation between all of these variables and differences among these variables
for different races compared to the historical Caucasian hierarchy that has
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dominated economically (Bisping et. al. 352). The status attainment theory
that was offered by Blau in the previous section seem to confirm this finding
and so does the research Bisping and Fain (2005) with the notion of a national
labor queue (Bisping et. al. 352). The model will attempt to answer the question
from a modern perspective using the most current economic data while trying
to paint a complete picture of the factors that influence income.
In order to complete such a task, the dependent variable will be in
logarithmic form to show the percent change in income for each of the
independent variables. This is the same form of the semi-log transformation
that Mincer provided in his earnings equation for the dependent variable
(Rosen 159). In order to measure such effects of race, the coefficients of each of
the independent variables tested in a multivariable analysis. If the coefficient
is negative for an independent variable then the net effect on the percentage of
income is negative while the opposite is true for a positive coefficient value.
Statistical significance of each of the variables and the model as a whole
is incredibly important in both understanding and placing confidence in the
findings. For individual variables, if the t statistic is greater than the critical
value at n degrees of freedom at five percent significance then we can reject the
null hypothesis that the coefficient is statistically insignificant. If the model,
as a whole, is significant then the p value for the F statistic will be less than
α=0.05 and the null hypothesis that the coefficients are jointly insignificant can
be dismissed.
The hypothesis being tested in this model would be confirmed if minority
groups made less than or equal to that of Caucasians on a regional level, as well
differing measures of human capital, and other differing measures of individual
characteristics. In order to test such a hypothesis a multivariable analysis will
be offered. This multivariable regression will be run with numerous dummy
variables for measures of qualitative data (such as race, region, gender,
marital status, occupation, ect.) versus quantitative data (such as educational
attainment and age). There will be numerous interaction terms with race
against occupation, education, gender, age, marital status, geographical region,
and educational attainment. In order to correct for perfect multicollinearity,
one dummy variable for each group of the dummy variables that will be
created must be excluded. The excluded dummy variables will be reflected
in the constant coefficient (β0) as well as the intercept value of the equation
estimation. The model is as follows:
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lnIncome =
age,

€

f (race, gender, usual hours worked, region, education, education2,
age2, occupation, marital status, race*gender, race*usual
hours worked, race*region, race*education, race*education2,
race*age, race*age2, race*occupation, race*marital status)

The above model compares the percentage change in income of a single,
white, male, residing in the East North Central Region, and is in a management
occupation against the other dummy variables that are in the equation.1 The
constant is the comparative term to the rest of the dummy variables.
The other quantitative measures: age, years of education, and usual hours
worked is a measure the marginal effect on the percentage change of income.
Two variables are specifically notable. The variables of age and years of
education both have a squared term counterpart. This occurs because usually
these two variables do not move in a linear relationship as they increase, but as
an exponential relationship (specifically as a quadratic). The marginal effect of
age is the sum of β2+2β3(Age). This value was computed by taking the derivative
of the age variables. The same transformation would be applied to education to
find its marginal effect with respect to income.
The interaction terms that the economic model contains compare two
changes from the constant, omitted dummy variables term. Notice that these
interaction terms encompass the race (black, white, other) and other variables
in the equation. This economic model is comprehensive in an attempt to
precisely identify the factors to income in a hope to identify racial problems.
The model is similar to that proposed by Mincer to measure wage and
encompasses measures of status attainment by occupation proposed by Blau
(Rosen 159) (Guan et. al. 115). This should produce a modern economic model
to estimate the overall affects of race on income in a hybridized OLS estimation
model. If the hypothesis is confirmed then the race and racial interaction terms
should produce lower (or equal) coefficients. This would prove that there is the
existence of a racial wage gap today and the examination of the regional affects
could suggest where major problems still exist as compared to others. 2
The data used for this examination of income with respect for race has
its limitations. The model that was proposed in the previous section only
examines one part of the evidence that can be used in determining the effects of
1 Full Equation in Appendix A
2 Note that time series analysis will not be offered but simply a cross sectional snapshot which cannot
empirically show a shift in the wage gap without the use of a Chow Test on Panel Data.
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income distribution. The data for this study was gathered from the Integrated
Public Use Microdata Census project (IPUMS), which organizes and codes
individual United States survey data (Steven et. al.). The particular data that
will be examined in this study will use American Community Survey (ACS)
of 2005. The ACS is a 1 in 100 national survey that encompasses over 1.1
million households and 2.878 million individuals that will prove to be essential
to the validity of the findings because of the number of observations (Steven
et. al.). Also if note is that this data is cross sectional data, which provides for
a snapshot of the wage gap currently. This interpretation from the data and
evidence should not be construed to show the shift of such a curve but how it
affected individuals in 2005.
The assumption that all surveys are answered truthfully and completely
is a flawed one. Many individuals who answer such surveys do not always
answer the question that is being answered or the data is not always answered
truthfully because of a privacy concern. This could produce bias or inconsistent
results. An optimal data set would contain complete and actual data on each of
the individuals surveyed in order to lead to complete, unbiased, and consistent
results for the OLS regression. However, the sheer number of observations
and the reliability of the reputable American Community Survey and IPUMS
should decrease the probability of flawed results.
As was stated in previously, this data will incorporate dummy variables,
whose observations will take either a 1 or 0. The value of 1 will be assigned if
the individual being surveyed fits into the particular categorical variable or 0 if
they do not. This measure will be applied to cross sectional, discrete, qualitative
data while the continuous variables will take a specific input from the values
observed. For instance age for an individual could be 45 in contrast to the
variable female which would take a value of 1 in the individual was female or 0
if the individual was male.
The number of observations for this particular data set that is being
regressed is 1,346,250 and the changes for the regression OLS estimates will
be in percentage changes with respect to the percentage change in income (and
against the constant term). Statistically insignificant terms, probability values
for the t statistic less than α=0.05, will not be reflected in the results but this
will be noted as each section of the results is discussed and in Appendix B.
		 The dependent variable is the natural log of the total amount of income
and wage. Any observations for an individual who makes an income of zero
will be dropped from the data because this analysis will focus on factors of the
change in percent of income in the current labor force. This will be important
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when also examining the factor of age. The variable age was dropped if the
individual was under the age of 18 or over the age of 65. The mean income of
the data set was 39,624.42 and the mean age of 40.795.
The independent variables used in the OLS regression for race where
divided into four dummy variables. The first variable white, takes a value of 1 if
the variable is white or 0 for non-white. The variable “White” is defined by those
who are both Caucasian and Hispanic (Steven et. al.). The variable “white” will
be omitted from the regression, will be included in the constant, and therefore
comparative to all the other dummy variables. The variable “Black” includes
all individuals who are of African American descent and identify themselves
as black (Steven et. al.). The variable “Asian”, reflect those individuals who are
Asian or Pacific Islander (Steven et. al.). The variable “other” is for those who
are not included in the category of white, black, or Asian. It is important to
note that for this analysis, added to this category are the indigenous population
(Native Americans) from the original survey results reported by the ACS and
organized by IPUMS.
Figure 1. Frequency of Race Survey Data

Asian
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1%

Black
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85%
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The graph above shows the break down of the percentages of individuals
surveyed and included in this regression. The number of observations as
stated above for this data set was 1,346,250 and for this data set the amount
of African American individuals that were sampled shows that there could be
some bias in regression results. According to Census Scope, which is a product
of the Social Science Data Analysis Network, the African American population
accounts for 12.1% of the total population for the 2000 United States Census
Survey (“CensusScope -- Demographic Maps: African-American Population”).
Such a discrepancy in the representation of the population through this sample
could lead to some biased and inconsistent results, which would not reflect the
true β for the estimation.
The regional variables were divided into 9 different geographical regions
in dummy variables as designated by the United States census and IPUMS
classification (Steven et. al.). The East North Central region will be omitted
from the regression because of perfect multicollinearity among dummy
variables. The regions in the data are as shown in Figure 2 below, along with
mean income and number of observations for each of the specific regions.
Figure 2. Regional Mean Income and Wage Observations

Notice that the omitted variable East North Central, has a mean income of
37,594.00 that lies somewhat in the middle of the data set which will be a good
measure for comparing differing regions in the OLS regression analysis.
Occupation, marital status, and gender are generated dummy variables
from the original equation. There are 25 occupations that are incorporated
into the data with varying categories and 24 will be used in the regression. The
variable “management” has a relatively high mean of 74,927.50 and a standard
deviation of 61,516.55. This variable will be omitted from the regression and
the definitions of the other occupation variables are offered in Appendix C.
Marital status has five different dummy variables (single, married, divorced,
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widowed, and separated) and the variable “single” is dropped from the
regression equation. The variable “single” has the lowest average income of
all of the variables, 24,994.82, while those who are married have the highest
average income, 46,950.95. By no means is this a surprising factor, because
those who are older tend to be married and also have a higher income. The final
dummy variable gender, are obviously divided into male and female variables.
The variable male has a mean income of 48,394.13 and a standard deviation
of 47,672.79 while females have a mean income of 30,429.30 and a standard
deviation of 30,575.10. A clear gender gap that still exists and the variable
“male” will be omitted from the regression.
Figure 3. Summary Statistics for Continuous Data3

The variable “Years of Education” was recoded in order to accommodate
for preschool and kindergarten education. The number of years of education
and the percentage change in income has a positive correlation of 0.315 and
the mean education that an individual receives in the survey is 13.49 years as
shown above in Figure 3. Education is a large component to income which
is reflected in the positive correlation in the percentage change in income
and the average individual in the data receive their high school diploma. The
relationship between human capital (years of education being one factor in this
case) and amount of income one receives is an already time tested model by
Mincer (Rosen 159).
The final variable examined, the amount of hours usually worked in a
workweek, also has opposite correlation effects on the percentage change in
income. The amount of income hours worked increases as income does. The
average amount of hours worked for the data set is 39.8141, shown in Figure 3,
the standard workweek. This is not surprising and matches the intuition about
the amount of hours worked in the American workweek.
III. Empirical Results
The full results of the regression analysis for the model that was in Section
II is displayed in Appendix B. The Breusch-Pagan test statistic of 44,583.32
for the equation estimation identified the problem of heteroskedasticity. This
3

Values will be rounded to four decimal places.
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BP test statistic has a p value of 0.000 and because it is less than α=0.05, the
null hypothesis of homoskedasticity can be rejected. This has prompted the
regression to be re-estimated with robust standard errors using the white
correlation matrix to correct this problem. With the correction, the first of
three different results of particular interest will be discussed in detail, after
significance of the individual variables and the model as a whole is discussed.
The F test statistic, which tests that all of the coefficients are significantly
different than zero, yielded a result of 5,696.86. The p value for the F statistic
for this equation is equal to 0.000 which is less than α=0.05 so we can reject that
the coefficients of the model are jointly insignificant. This result is reflected
in Appendix B. Each individual variable was also tested for significance by
calculating a t test statistic from the regression results. The p values for the t
test statistic that were greater than α=0.05 are reflected in Appendix B without
asterisks.
For instance, the p value of the t statistic for the variable “other” indicates
that there is not a difference in the nominal income of an individual who’s race
is considered “other” against the constant white individual with all of the same
characteristics besides race. The same is true of occupational, marital status,
regional, and continuous (usual hours worked and years of education) variables
that are interacted with race. The interaction variables that were interacted
with age were dropped for reasons of perfect multicollinearity and are not
reflected above for the races of Asian and other. This lack of significance for
the variable of “other” is in conflict with the original hypothesis that being nonwhite has a negative impact on an individual’s nominal income. This will be
compared to the results found for significant variables in the preceding part of
this section and in the conclusion. It should also be mentioned that in order
to combat omitted variable bias the variables that are in Appendix B without
asterisks are included in the final regression. Omitting such variables could
cause biased estimates of the parameters.
The evaluation of the R-squared term is essential to understanding the
prediction capability of the model as a whole. The R-squared term reflects the
proportion of the variance of the dependent variable that can be explained
by the independent variables (“Annotated Stata Output: Regression”). The
R-squared value for the equation that was regressed from the model in
Section II is 0.4902. This would indicate that 49.02% of the variance in the
percent change in income could be predicted from the independent variables
(“Annotated Stata Output: Regression”). This is not a bad measure of fit for how
well the model is at predicting income assuming that there are many different
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variables that can be used to predict income which cannot be measured, such as
drive to succeed and ambition. This R-squared value vastly improved when the
variable of occupation was added to the regression and therefore occupation
improved the prediction of the dependent variable, which is to be expected.
The continuous variable “years of education” produced a value of -0.0235
and a value of 0.0042 for the variable “years of education2”. This relationship
between income and education in quadratic terms is the same function that
Mincer used in his earnings equation to examine the gender wage gap in the
United States (Rosen 159). Such will be applied here to look at the differences
in racial variables with individuals who have the same amount of education. In
Figure 4, the table reflects the significant interaction terms between race and
years of education. Also, there are the coefficients for the variables of race in
the East North Central Division. This analysis will first encompass how race
effects income against education in the East North Central Division and then
examine how these effects are administered for other regions of the United
States in the same comparative nature against the constant term with the same
amount of education.
Figure 4. Statistically Significant Regression Results for Education,
Race, and Gender in the East North Central Region (and applicable
interactions)4
Variable2

Coefficient

Robust Std. Error

Year of Education

-0.0235

0.0015

Year of Education2

0.0042

0.0001

Black*Years of Education

-0.0194

0.0058

Black*Years of Education2

0.0010

0.0002

Black

-0.2200

0.0531

Asian

0.3113

0.0417

Female

-0.2630

0.0019

Black*Female

0.1326

0.0065

Asian*Female

0.0888

0.0079

Other*Female

0.0528

0.0208

Constant

5.9599

0.0148

4 Not included in the findings are the insignificant variables which had a p value for the t statistic greater than
α=0.05 which are in Figure 4.
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Figure 4 contains some interesting results go to disproving the hypothesis of
being a non-white male has a negative affect on income in this particular region.
Asian males and females have a larger change in income than the constant
white single male term, which is reflected in the constant variable. To see the
results more clearly, Figure 5 has a linear representation of the marginal change
in income on one additional year of education.
Figure 5. Marginal Effect of Education on Managerial Income by Race
and Gender in the East North Central Division

What should be noted in this graphical depiction is the intercept of each of
the linear equations graphed with respect to the constant. Single managers
who reside in this region are all compared with education for differing variants
for race and gender. The line with the lowest intercept is the black female.
The average black single female manager in this region makes 33.10% less than
the constant comparative term whereas the white female makes only 26.30%
less than the constant term. The black female makes substantially less than her
white counterpart.
The trend for Asian individuals receiving more income for an increase in
education transcends gender. The Asian male makes 31.11% more than the
constant term and the Asian female only makes 13.11% less than the constant
term. Both of these terms show that Asians make more on average than their
white counterparts when compared to gender. This is a clear depiction that the
gender gap exists, however, Asian individuals receive the highest utility out of
all of the racial groups.
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The racial wage gap still clearly exists between black and white individuals
with the same constant comparative dummy variable terms. Black individuals
make 22% less than the constant comparative term in this equation. This
indicates that Asian women, “other” women, white males, and Asian males
make more than a black male in a managerial position for the same amount
of education in the East North Central Region. These groups receive more
income than the black male for each additional year of education. Such a result
is discouraging when examining the racial wage gap divide in the United States
and reinforces the hypothesis that such a wage gap does still exist.
The same comparisons can be made against other continuous nondummy variables in the OLS regression results. The coefficients for the usual
hours worked, age, and age2 is shown below in Figure 6.
Figure 6. Continuous Coefficient Estimations for Usual Hours Worked,
Age, and Age2
Variable

Coefficient

Robust Std. Error

Age

0.1132

0.0005

220.0100

Age2

-0.0012

0.0000

-196.6000

0.0389

0.0001

340.5800

-0.0058

0.0005

-12.3700

Usual Hours Worked
Asian*Usual hours worked

T Statistic

Omitted from Figure 6 are the interaction variables between race and age
dropped for reasons of multicollinearity. Also omitted from Figure 6 is the
interaction variables Black*Usual Hours Worked and Other*Usual Hours
Worked, because of lack of significance. These continuous variables can be
used with respect to the constant and the use of the other dummy variables to
calculate intercepts and find the effect of usual hours worked and age on income.
The amount of hours worked does positively increase the amount an individual
earns by 3.89% for each additional hour worked and this number decreases by
0.58%5 for each additional hour that an Asian individual works. The increase
in the amount an individual earns being positively correlated to income is
not surprising and are both supported by the previous research done in labor
economics by Mincer, Blau, and others previously cited in the literature review
((Rosen 159) (Guan et. al. 115) (Bisping et. al. 352)). The interesting result
is the effect of being Asian and the number of hours worked on the constant
term. This gain in earnings for other races is higher for the number of hours
5

Total Marginal Effect for an Asian individual is 3.31% for Hours worked within a workweek.
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worked when compared to the Asian individual. Such a finding is paramount
in balancing the effects of income and race with continuous variables (like the
results found for years of education).
The variables for age and age2 create a parabolic effect, which is shown
in Figure 8. (Guan et. al. 115). The marginal effect of one year of age is β1 +
0.1131896 +2*-0.0011914(Age) by taking the derivative of the age function, but
its quadratic form is graphed in Figure 7.
Figure 7. Effect of age on the percentage of income in East North
Central region for the constant white single male manager in the East
North Central region compared with a black individual with the same
characteristics.

We see this in Figure 7, with the maximum point of the quadratic age
function residing at 47.50. An individual’s income after this point will not
increase as age increases. Also, shown in Figure 7 is the age quadratic function
for a black individual with the same characteristics in the East North Central
Region. Here the wage gap between the two groups can clearly be seen, as was
the case in the analysis for educational attainment. Focusing on the results of
the amount of education and the percentage change in income is the original
function that Mincer used in his original analysis (Rosen 159). Both education
and age are measures of human capital, however, the results of the years of
education analysis provide a more in-depth analysis and allow for interaction
terms without multicollinearity.
The regional effects on income are interesting especially when looking at
the variables of race. Such are interesting and help to pinpoint specific areas
in which progress has been made in closing the wage gap and comparing
how minorities fair in these regions. Figure 8 shows the regression results
from statistically significant variables of the percentage change in income
when compared to the constant East North Central region with all of the
93

same constant dummy variables except for race. It is important to note that
the significant interaction terms are in terms of the percentage difference in
income when compared to that specific race variable for the East North Central
Division. For instance the interaction variable for “Black*Middle Atlantic” is
the percentage change between an individual who is Black, resides in the East
North Central Region, Single, and working in a managerial position. Such
results are illustrated more clearly in Figure 10, which depicts the percentage
change using a histogram.
Figure 8. Statistically Significant Regional Effects on Income (with race
interaction) compared to the constant regional variable East North
Central.
Region

Coefficient 	Robust Std. Error

New England

0.1109

0.0037

Middle Atlantic

0.0793

0.0028

West North Central

-0.0758

0.0033

East South Central

-0.0941

0.0038

West South Central

-0.1034

0.0031

South Atlantic

-0.0076

0.0026

Mountain

-0.0371

0.0035

Pacific

0.0878

0.0028

Black*Middle Atlantic

0.0770

0.0110

Black*New England

0.0720

0.0185

Black*West North Central

0.0465

0.0182

Black*South Atlantic

0.0245

0.0093

Black*Pacific

0.0565

0.0130

Asian*West North Central

0.0644

0.0270

Asian*West South Central

0.0598

0.0186

Asian*South Atlantic

0.0473

0.0164

Asian*Mountain

0.0910

0.0210

Asian*Pacific

0.0670

0.0142
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Figure 9. Managerial Income Percentage Change with Respect to the
Constant Term of East North Central White Single Male
New England

15

Black*New England
Middle Atlantic
Black*Midlantic

10

West North Central
Black*West North Central
Asian*West North Central

5

East South Central
West South Central
Asian*West South Central

0

South Atlantic
Black*South Atlantic
Asian*South Atlantic

-5

Mountain
Asian*Mountian
Pacific

-10

Black*Pacific
Asian*Pacific
-15

The graph in Figure 9 and the table in Figure 8 provide interesting results for
analysis. We can see for the New England Region that the wage for a white
individual increases by 11.09%, however, a black individual with the same
microeconomic characteristics in the same region only has 7.20% increase in
wage in income from the black individual in the East North Central Region.
The persistence and widening of the wage gap in the New England Region is
clear when looking at the comparative variables. If the black individual had
received the same increase in salary as the white individual then the wage gap
would be the same as East North Central division with the same characteristics.
This is not the case however, with a discouraging increase in the differences in
wage with an increase of 3.89% in the racial wage gap. This is in contrast to the
West North Central Division.
The interaction terms between Asian, Black, and West North Central
Division are statistically significantly. The regional variable West North
Central has decreased by 7.58% for the amount of income received for a white
individual with the same microeconomic characteristics. An Asian individual’s
income with the same characteristics has an increased income of 6.44% and
a black individual has an increased income by 4.65% when compared to the
racial variables for the East North Central region depicted in Figure 4. The
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more significant of the two findings is not the increasing of the income gap
between Asians and Whites in the West North Central Division but the
decreasing of the income gap between Black and White individuals with the
same characteristics when compared to the East North Central Region. Such
a gap leaves black individuals with only a 9.77% difference in wage with their
white counterparts in this region. This is a 12.23% narrowing from the 22.00%
gap in the East North Central Division between a black and white individual
with the same characteristics.
Two elements should be reiterated. The first element that should be noted
is the absence of the variable “other” in this particular variable analysis. This
would suggest that this variable and its interaction terms are not significantly
different from the constant term. This applies equally to the other variables for
interaction that were not included in Figure 8. The second element that should
be noted is the relationship that can be formed between the dummy variables,
which were not discussed (marital status and occupation), the interaction of
these variables with the race dummy variables, and the interaction of these
variables with the continuous variables discussed in the first part of this
section.
The statistically significant marital status variables, in Appendix B, can be
applied in the same way for analysis of both interaction and non-interaction
terms of the variables with respect to the constant. For instance an individual,
who is white, married, resides in the East North Central Division, and a manager
makes 15.11% more than a single individual who has the same characteristics.
These terms could also appear in the graph of Figure 5 to show how a constant
amount of education can affect the overall percentage of an individual income
and how this affects their marginal effect on income. This same approach can
be applied to occupation as well.
The implementation of comparing multiple different incomes for
occupational variables can be applied for analysis to gain both an industry and
skill based analysis. An individual who is white and works in the computer
industry makes 11.83% more than the manager in the East North Central
region with the same microeconomic characteristics. A black individual in the
computer industry makes only 10.13% more than a black manager in the East
North Central region with the same microeconomic characteristics. This is
further evidence that a racial gap does exist between individuals in other high
skilled labor markets. This same analysis can be applied to non-skilled based
jobs by applying the findings in Appendix B.
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IV. Conclusion
By combining the theories previously explored in this field labor economics,
a suitable model was formed in order to diagnose and analyze the current state
of the racial wage gap (Rosen 159) (Guan et. al. 115). Through the use of ACS
data and multivariable OLS regression, an in-depth analysis of variables that
pertain to the percentage of income was completed in Section III. Evidence in
this section shows that there is an existence of a racial and gender based wage
gap in the United States both on a regional and national level, however, this is
an oversimplification of the problem.
The literature review shows that a racial wage gap still exists on a national
level but not on regional level from Bisping and Fain’s findings (Bisping et. al.
352). The previous review of analysis show that there is an existence of an
income gap between African American individuals and white single manager
individuals in the East North Central Region of the United States. Being an
African American has a negative effect on income. The gender gap was also
shown in this analysis as well. Also being a white, black, other, or Asian female
has a negative effect on income against their microeconomic identical male
counterpart.
The surprising finding of this study shows that there is a wage gap between
Asian individuals and white individuals with the same microeconomic
characteristics. This might be the discrepancy that was found on the regional
level in East North Central region in this study and that found by Bisping
and Fain’s findings (Bisping et. al. 352). Breaking the groups down into more
specific classifications in and making this a broad overall snapshot from the
most recent data available were the most important distinctions from how this
study differed from other previous analysis.
Even though this model is comprehensive, adding more variables and
interaction terms could give clearer results for future studies. This would then
broaden the scope of the study and provide more information on other variables
that pertain to income such as place of origin or weight. Also, classifying
groups by ethnicity and race could provide more accurate results if the data
sample was an accurate representation of the United States population. The
analysis provided in this study would be most useful in showing how we need
as a society to correct the disparities between African Americans, females,
and white males with the same microeconomic characteristics. Only through
conscience effort can this goal be achieved through a national and regional
level. Such was the attempt of Affirmative Action but it is clear by this analysis
that the goal was not accomplished in 2005.
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Appendix A. Full Equation Regressed

lnIncomei = β0+ β2Age + β3Age2 + β4Usualhoursworked + β5MiddleAtlantic + β6EastNorthCentral +
β7WestNorthCentral + β8EastSouthCentral + β9WestSouthCentral
+β10SouthAtlantic +β11Mountain + β12Pacific+β13Black+β14Asian +β15Other +
β16Female +β17MarriedSpouse + β18Widowed +β19Seperated +β20Divorced +
β21YearsofEducation + β22YearsofEducation2+ β23Buisopp+ β24FinancialSpecialist +
β25Compmath + β26EngArch + β27Science +β28CommunitySocial + β29Legal + β30Edocc
+β31ArtMediaSports + β32HealthCarePrac + β33Healthcaresupport+β34Protect
+β35Food + β36CleanMaintain +β37PersonalCare +β38Sales +β39OffAdSup
+β40FarmFish +β41Construction +β42Extraction +β43InstallMaintRepair
+β44Production +β45Transportation +β46Military + β48(Black*MiddleAtlantic)i+ β49
(Black* EastNorthCentral)I …+β55(Black*Pacific)i + β56(Asian*MiddleAtlantic)i+
β57(Asian*EastNorthCentral)I …+β63(Asian*Pacific)i+ β64(Other* MiddleAtlantic)
+ β65(Other*EastNorthCentral)I …+β71(Other*Pacific)I + β72(Black*MarriedSpouse)
i
+ β73(Black*Widowed)I …+β75(Black*Divorced)i+ β76(Asian*MarriedSpouse)
i
+ β77(Asian*Widowed)I …+β79(Asian*Divorced)i+ β80(Other*MarriedSpouse)
i
+ β81(Other*Widowed)I …+β83 (Other*Divorced)i+ β84(Black*Yearsofed)i+
i
β85(Black*YearsofEducation2)I +β86(Asian*Yearsofed)i+ β87(Asian *YearsofEducation2)I
+β88(Other*Yearsofed)i+ β89(Other*YearsofEducation2)I +β90(Black*Female)i+ β91(Asian*
Female)I +β92(Other*Female)i+ β93(Black*Age)i+ β94(Black*Age2)I+β95(Asian*Age)
+ β96(Asian*Age2)I +β97(Other*Age)I + β99(Other*Age2)I + β100(Black*Buisopp)
i
+ β102(Black*FinancialSpecialist)I +…+β124 (Black*Military) + β125(Asian*Buisopp)
i
+ β126(Asian*FinancialSpecialist)I+…+β149(Asian*Military) + β150(Other*Buisopp)i+
i
β151(Other*FinancialSpecialist)I+…+β171(Other*Military)

Appendix B. Full Regression Results (*Statistically Significant at the 5% Level)
Variable
Constant

Est. Earnings 	Robust
Effect 	Std. Err.
5.9599*
0.0148

P>t
0

AGE:
Age
Age^2
Black*Age
Black*Age^2

0.1132*
-0.0012*
0.0034
0.0000

0.0005
0.0000
0.0018
0.0000

0
0
0.056
0.814

USUAL HOURS WORKED:
Usual Hours Worked
Asian*Usual Hours Worked
Black*Usual Hours Worked
Other*Usual Hours Worked

0.0389*
-0.0058*
-0.0007
-0.0023

0.0001
0.0005
0.0004
0.0012

0
0
0.085
0.051

EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT:
Years of Education
Years of Education^2
Black*Years of Education
Black*Years of Education^2
Asian*Years of Education
Asian*Year of Education^2
Other*Years of Education
Other*Years of Education^2

-0.0235*
0.0042*
-0.0194*
0.0010*
-0.0047
-0.0004
-0.0186
0.0002

0.0015
0.0001
0.0058
0.0002
0.0046
0.0002
0.0122
0.0005

0
0
0.001
0
0.301
0.062
0.129
0.781
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REGION:
New England
0.1109*
Middle Atlantic
0.0793*
West North Central
-0.0758*
East South Central
-0.0941*
West South Central
-0.1034*
South Atlantic
-0.0076*
Mountain
-0.0371*
Pacific 0.0878* 		
Black*Middle Atlantic
0.0770*
Black*New England
0.0720*
Black*West North Central
0.0465*
Black*East South Central
-0.0096
Black*West South Central
-0.0032
Black*South Atlantic
0.0245*
Black*Mountain
0.0388
Black*Pacific
0.0565*
Asian*Middle Atlantic
-0.0085
Asian*New England
0.0246
Asian*West North Central
0.0644*
Asian*East South Central
0.0443
Asian*West South Central
0.0598*
Asian*South Atlantic
0.0473*
Asian*Mountain
0.0910*
Asian*Pacific
0.0670*
Other*Middle Atlantic
0.0623
Other*New England
0.0088
Other*West North Central
-0.0871
Other*East South Central
0.0015
Other*West South Central
-0.0212
Other*South Atlantic
0.0201
Other*Mountain
-0.0427
Other*Pacific
-0.0625

0.0037
0.0028
0.0033
0.0038
0.0031
0.0026
0.0035
0.0028
0.0110
0.0185
0.0182
0.0119
0.0112
0.0093
0.0208
0.0130
0.0162
0.0221
0.0270
0.0327
0.0186
0.0164
0.0210
0.0142
0.0408
0.0485
0.0450
0.0550
0.0342
0.0357
0.0346
0.0336

0
0
0
0
0
0.004
0
0
0
0
0.011
0.419
0.776
0.009
0.062
0
0.599
0.267
0.017
0.175
0.001
0.004
0
0
0.127
0.855
0.053
0.978
0.536
0.573
0.216
0.063

RACE:
Black
Asian
Other

-0.2200*
0.3113*
0.1420

0.0531
0.0417
0.1018

0
0
0.163

GENDER:
Female
Black*Female
Asian*Female
Other*Female

-0.2630*
0.1326*
0.0888*
0.0528*

0.0019 0
0.0065 0
0.0079 0
0.0208 0.011

MARITAL STATUS:
Married
Widowed
Separated
Divorced
Black*Married
Black*Widowed
Black*Separated
Black*Divorced
Asian*Married
Asian*Widowed

0.1511*
0.0729*
-0.0368*
0.0792*
0.0089
-0.0250
0.0272
0.0015
-0.0251*
-0.0082

0.0023
0.0072
0.0067
0.0032
0.0070
0.0195
0.0144
0.0093
0.0085
0.0321

100

0
0
0
0
0.202
0.199
0.06
0.873
0.003
0.798

Asian*Separated
Asian * Divorced
Other*Married
Other*Widowed
Other*Separated
Other*Divorced
OCCUPATION:
BusinessOp
Financial
ComputerMath
Engineering
Science
Community
Legal
Teachers
Media
Doctors
Nurses
Protect
Food
Maintain
PersonalCare
Sales
OfficeAdmin
FamingFishing
Construction
Extraction
InstallMaint
Production
Transportation
Military
Black*BusinessOp
Black*Financial
Black*ComputerMath
Black*Engineering
Black*Science
Black*Community
Black*Legal
Black*Teachers
Black*Media
Black*Doctors
Black*Protect
Black*Food
Black*Maintain
Black*PersonalCare
Black*Sales
Black*OfficeAdmin
Black*FamingFishing
Black*Construction
Black*Extraction
Black*InstallMaint
Black*Production
Black*Transportation
Black*Military
Asian*BusinessOp

0.1047*
0.0848*
0.0573*
0.1001
0.0231
0.0479

0.0330
0.0163
0.0203
0.0614
0.0523
0.0283

0.001
0
0.005
0.103
0.658
0.09

-0.0412*
-0.0242*
0.1184*
0.0292*
-0.1913*
-0.4519*
0.0011
-0.4998*
-0.3807*
0.0217*
-0.4313*
-0.2732*
-0.7077*
-0.7162*
-0.7574*
-0.3593*
-0.3120*
-0.9619*
-0.3398*
-0.4208*
-0.2248*
-0.3480*
-0.5340*
-0.3405*
0.0574*
-0.0133
0.1003*
0.0851*
0.0809*
0.1503*
0.0293
0.1363*
0.1660*
-0.0101
0.0426*
-0.0220
-0.0027
0.0348
-0.1653*
0.0543*
0.0098
-0.1412*
0.0021
0.0787*
-0.0284*
0.0461*
0.2702*
0.0067

0.0055
0.0053
0.0049
0.0049
0.0079
0.0062
0.0080
0.0039
0.0074
0.0039
0.0064
0.0057
0.0051
0.0058
0.0071
0.0037
0.0032
0.0108
0.0044
0.0218
0.0044
0.0039
0.0044
0.0132
0.0180
0.0185
0.0182
0.0225
0.0309
0.0157
0.0290
0.0130
0.0318
0.0150
0.0161
0.0159
0.0167
0.0191
0.0131
0.0099
0.0546
0.0190
0.1207
0.0176
0.0130
0.0136
0.0363
0.0252

0
0
0
0
0
0
0.892
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.001
0.47
0
0
0.009
0
0.311
0
0
0.501
0.008
0.166
0.873
0.068
0
0
0.858
0
0.986
0
0.029
0.001
0
0.792
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Asian*Financial
Asian*ComputerMath
Asian*Engineering
Asian*Science
Asian*Community
Asian*Legal
Asian*Teachers

-0.0854*
0.0710*
0.0747*
-0.0689*
-0.0984*
0.0119
-0.1085*

0.0207
0.0166
0.0187
0.0246
0.0346
0.0415
0.0210

0
0
0
0.005
0.004
0.775
0

Appendix C. Definitions of Occupational Variables
Variable

Occupation Definition

BusinessOp
Financial
ComputerMath
Engineering
Science
Community
Legal
Teachers
Media
Doctors
Nurses
Protect
Food
Maintaince
PersonalCare
Sales
OfficeAdmin
FamingFishing
Construction
Extraction
InstallMaint
Production
Transportation
Military

Business Operations Specialists
Financial Specialists
Computer and Mathematical Occupations
Architecture and Engineering Occupations
Life, Physical, and Social Science Occupations
Community and Social Services Occupations
Legal Occupations
Education, Training, and Library Occupations
Arts, Design, Entertainment, Sports, and Media Occupations
Healthcare Practitioners and Technical Occupations
Healthcare Support Occupations
Protective Service Occupations
Food Preparation and Serving Occupations
Building and Grounds Cleaning and Maintenance Occupations
Personal Care and Service Occupations
Sales Occupations
Office and Administrative Support Occupations
Farming, Fishing, and Forestry Occupations
Construction Trades
Extraction Workers
Installation, Maintenance, and Repair Workers
Production Occupations
Transportation and Material Moving Occupations
Military Personnel
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